Optimal Monetary Policy in a Liquidity Trap by Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









Prepared for the International Workshop on Overcoming Deflation and Revitalizing the Japanese Economy,
Economic and Social Research Institute, Tokyo, September 18, 2003. Parts of this paper have previously
appeared in Eggertsson andWoodford (2003). We would like to thank Tamim Bayoumi, Ben Bernanke, Robin
Brooks, Michael Dotsey, Martin Feldstein, Benjamin Friedman, Stefan Gerlach, Mark Gertler, Marvin
Goodfriend, Kenneth Kuttner, Maurice Obstfeld, Athanasios Orphanides, Kenneth Rogoff, David Small, Lars
Svensson, Harald Uhlig, Tsutomu Watanabe, and Alex Wolman for helpful comments, and the National
Science Foundation for research support through a grant to the NBER. The views expressed in this paper are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy, nor are they necessarily
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by Gauti B. Eggertsson and Michael Woodford.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including ©
notice, is given to the source.Optimal Monetary Policy in a Liquidity Trap
Gauti B. Eggertsson and Michael Woodford
NBER Working Paper No. 9968
September 2003
JEL No. E52   
ABSTRACT
We consider the consequences for monetary policy of the zero floor for nominal interest rates. The
zero bound can be a significant constraint on the ability of a central bank to combat deflation. We
show, in the context of an intertemporal equilibrium model, that open-market operations, even of
“unconventional” types, are ineffective if they do not change expectations about the future conduct
of policy; in this sense, a “liquidity trap” is possible. Nonetheless, a credible commitment to the
right sort of history-dependent policy can largely mitigate the distortions created by the zero bound.
In our model, optimal policy involves a commitment to adjust interest rates so as to achieve a time-
varying price-level target, when this is consistent with the zero bound. We also discuss ways in
which other central-bank actions, while irrelevant apart from their effects on expectations, may help
to make credible a central bank's commitment to its target, and consider implications for the policy












woodford@princeton.eduThe consequences for the proper conduct of monetary policy of the existence of a lower
bound of zero for overnight nominal interest rates has recently become a topic of lively
interest. The relevance of this bound is nowhere more apparent than in the case of Japan,
where the call rate (the overnight cash rate that is analogous to the federal funds rate in the
U.S.) has been essentially at zero for most of the time since February 1999, when the policy
board of the Bank of Japan decided to make it “as low as possible”. (As shown in Figure
1, the call rate has actually been at or below 50 basis points since October 1995, so that
little room for further reductions in short-term nominal interest rates has existed since that
time.) At the same time, growth has remained anemic in Japan over this period, and prices
have continued to fall, suggesting to many observers a need for further monetary stimulus.
Yet the usual remedy — lower short-term nominal interest rates — is plainly unavailable.
This has led to interest in policies that might bring about further monetary stimulus,
even taking as given the BOJ’s “zero interest rate policy” (ZIRP). Since March 2001, the
BOJ has supplemented the ZIRP with a policy of “quantitative easing,” in which the supply
of reserves to the banking system is increased beyond the level required in order to keep the
call rate at zero.1 But even quite vigorous expansion of the monetary base (which, as shown
in the ﬁgure, is now more than twice as large, relative to GDP, as in the early 1990s) has not
as of yet been able to halt the deﬂation. This suggests that Japan is currently experiencing a
“liquidity trap” of the kind hypothesized by Keynes (1936), though the practical possibility
of such a situation continued for decades to be debated.2 The result is that a problem
that was long treated as a mere theoretical curiosity — the question of what, if anything,
monetary policy could do to halt deﬂation under such circumstances — now appears to be
one of urgent practical importance.
1See Kimura et al. (2002) for discussion of this policy, as well as an expression of doubts about its
eﬀectiveness.
2Hetzel (2003) argues that there is no liquidity trap in Japan, on the ground that the public’s holdings of
M2 plus CDs remains only a little higher than an estimated demand function estimated using earlier data
would have predicted; “there is no mushrooming demand indicative of a liquidity trap” (p. 32). But one
should not expect to see “mushrooming demand” for money holdings on the part of the public, if the BOJ
has no way of forcing the creation of additional M2. The monetary base is substantially higher now than a
demand function estimated on data prior to 2001 would have predicted (see, e.g., Kimura et al., 2002), and
this is what the BOJ policy of “quantitative easing” requires the private sector to hold more of.
1The fact that the federal funds rate has now been reduced to only one percent in the
U.S., while signs of recovery remain exceedingly fragile, has led many to wonder if the U.S.
could not also soon ﬁnd itself in a situation where interest-rate policy would no longer be
available as a tool for macroeconomic stabilization. In the U.S. debate as well, there has been
considerable discussion of whether open-market operations should not still be eﬀective in
increasing nominal aggregate demand even when the zero bound on interest rates is reached.
Some have suggested that while open-market purchases of short-term Treasury bills should
be ineﬀective under such a circumstance — on the ground that short-term Treasury paper
and base money become nearly perfect substitutes in the portfolios of private traders once
the federal funds rate falls to zero — open-market purchases of other kinds of assets (longer-
maturity Treasury bonds, or even real assets), that do not promise the same state-contingent
returns as money, should still stimulate aggregate demand.3 While Chairman Greenspan’s
congressional testimony in July 2003 has indicated that the Fed is unlikely to resort to such
“unconventional” open-market operations in the near term, the question of the degree to
which such operations would be more eﬀective is an important one, especially for countries
like Japan, where the risk of deﬂation is no longer a matter of conjecture.4
The question of how policy should be conducted when the zero bound is reached raises
fundamental issues for the theory of monetary policy. Is a “liquidity trap” really possible,
in the sense of a situation in which there is really nothing that the central bank can do to
increase aggregate nominal spending or prevent continuing deﬂation? If monetary policy can
instead be eﬀective even when the zero bound has been reached, does its eﬀectiveness depend
on a resort to “unconventional” forms of open-market operations? And to what extent is the
optimal conduct of policy diﬀerent than it would be if the zero bound were never a binding
constraint?
Here we seek to shed light on these issues by considering the consequences of the zero lower
3See, e.g., Bernanke (2002), Cecchetti (2003), and Clouse et al. (2003).
4For example, Meltzer (2003) argues that “quantitative easing” was ineﬀective in Japan until the BOJ
began purchasing longer-term JGBs, but attributes the recent increase in Japanese real growth to a policy
of money-ﬁnanced bond purchases.

















Figure 1: Evolution of the call rate on uncollateralized overnight loans in Japan, and the
Japanese monetary base relative to GDP [1992 = 1.0].
bound on nominal interest rates for the optimal conduct of monetary policy, in the context of
an explicit intertemporal equilibrium model of the monetary transmission mechanism. While
our model remains an extremely simple one, we believe that it can help to clarify basic issues.
We are able to consider the extent to which the zero bound represents a genuine constraint
on attainable equilibrium paths for inﬂation and real activity, and to consider the extent
to which open-market purchases of various kinds of assets by the central bank can mitigate
that constraint. We are also able to show how the character of optimal monetary policy
changes as a result of the existence of the zero bound, relative to the policy rules that would
be judged optimal in the absence of such a bound, or in the case of real disturbances small
enough for the bound never to matter under an optimal policy.
To preview our results, we ﬁnd that the zero bound does represent an important con-
3straint on what monetary stabilization policy can achieve, at least when certain kinds of real
disturbances are encountered in an environment of low inﬂation. We argue that the possibil-
ity of expansion of the monetary base through central-bank purchases of a variety of types
of assets does little if anything to expand the set of feasible equilibrium paths for inﬂation
and real activity that are consistent with equilibrium under some (fully credible) policy com-
mitment. Hence the relevant tradeoﬀs can correctly be studied by simply considering what
can be achieved by alternative anticipated state-contingent paths of the short-term nominal
interest rate, taking into account the constraint that this quantity must be non-negative at
all times. When we consider such a problem, we ﬁnd that the zero interest-rate bound can
indeed be temporarily binding, and in such a case it inevitably results in lower welfare than
could be achieved in the absence of such a constraint.5
Nonetheless, we argue that the extent to which this constraint restricts possible stabiliza-
tion outcomes under sound policy is much more modest than is presumed by the deﬂation
pessimists who have been widely quoted in the U.S. and European ﬁnancial press in recent
months. Even though the set of feasible equilibrium outcomes corresponds to those that can
be achieved through alternative interest-rate policies, monetary policy is far from powerless
to mitigate the contractionary eﬀects of the kind of disturbances that would make the zero
bound a binding constraint. The key to dealing with this sort of situation in the least dam-
aging way is to create the right kind of expectations regarding the way in which monetary
policy will be used subsequently, at a time when the central bank again has room to maneu-
ver. We use our intertemporal equilibrium model to characterize the kind of expectations
5We do not here explore the possibility of relaxing the constraint by taxing money balances, as originally
proposed by Gesell (1929) and Keynes (1936), and more recently by Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999) and
Goodfriend (2000). While this represents a solution to the problem in theory, there are substantial practical
diﬃculties with such a proposal, not least the political opposition that such an institutional change would
be likely to generate. Our consideration of the optimal policy problem also abstracts from the availability
of ﬁscal instruments such as the time-varying tax policy recommended by Feldstein (2002). We agree with
Feldstein that there is a particularly good case for state-contingent ﬁscal policy as a way of dealing with a
liquidity trap, even if ﬁscal policy is not a very useful tool for stabilization policy more generally. Nonetheless,
we consider here only the problem of the proper conduct of monetary policy, taking as given the structure
of tax distortions. As long as one does not think that state-contingent ﬁscal policy can (or will) be used
to eliminate even temporary declines in the natural rate of interest below zero, the problem for monetary
policy that we consider here remains relevant.
4regarding future policy that it would be desirable to create, and discuss a form of price-level
targeting rule that — if credibly committed to by the central bank — should bring about
the constrained-optimal equilibrium. We also discuss, more informally, ways in which other
types of policy actions could help to increase the credibility of the central bank’s announced
commitment to this kind of future policy.
Our analysis will be recognized as a development of several key themes of Paul Krug-
man’s (1998) treatment of the same topic. Like Krugman, we give particular emphasis to
the role of expectations regarding future policy in determining the severity of the distortions
that result from hitting the zero bound. Our primary contribution, relative to Krugman’s
earlier treatment, will be the presentation of a more fully dynamic analysis. For example, our
assumption of staggered pricing, rather than the simple hypothesis of prices that are ﬁxed
for one period as in the analysis of Krugman, allows for richer (and at least somewhat more
realistic) dynamic responses to disturbances. In our model, unlike Krugman’s, a real distur-
bance that lowers the natural rate of interest can cause output to remain below potential for
years (as shown in Figure 2 below), rather than only for a single “period”, even when the
average frequency of price adjustments is more than once per year. These richer dynamics
are also important for a realistic discussion of the kind of policy commitment that can help
to reduce economic contraction during a “liquidity trap”. In our model, a commitment to
create subsequent inﬂation involves a commitment to keep interest rates low for a time in
the future, whereas in Krugman’s model, a commitment to a higher future price level does
not involve any reduction in future nominal interest rates. We are also better able to discuss
questions such as how the creation of inﬂationary expectations during the period that the
zero bound is binding can be reconciled with maintaining the credibility of the central bank’s
commitment to long-run price stability.
Our dynamic analysis also allows us to further clarify the several ways in which the
management of private-sector expectations by the central bank can be expected to mitigate
the eﬀects of the zero bound. Krugman emphasizes the fact that increased expectations
of inﬂation can lower the real interest rate implied by a zero nominal interest rate. This
5might suggest, however, that the central bank can aﬀect the economy only insofar as it
aﬀects expectations regarding a variable that it cannot inﬂuence except quite indirectly;
and it might also suggest that the only expectations that should matter are those regarding
inﬂation over the relatively short horizon corresponding to the short-term nominal interest
rate that has fallen to zero. Such interpretations easily lead to skepticism about the practical
eﬀectiveness of the expectational channel, especially if inﬂation is regarded as being relatively
“sticky” in the short run. Our model is instead one in which expectations aﬀect aggregate
demand through several channels. First of all, it is not merely short-term real interest
rates that matter for current aggregate demand; our model of intertemporal substitution
in spending implies that the entire expected future path of short real rates should matter,
or alternatively that very long real rates should matter.6 This means that the creation of
inﬂation expectations, even with regard to inﬂation that should occur only more than a
year in the future, should also be highly relevant to aggregate demand, as long as it is not
accompanied by correspondingly higher expected future nominal interest rates. Furthermore,
the expected future path of nominal interest rates matters, and not just their current level,
so that a commitment to keep nominal interest rates low for a longer period of time should
stimulate aggregate demand, even when current rates cannot be further lowered, and even
under the hypothesis that inﬂation expectations would remain unaﬀected. Since the central
bank can clearly control the future path of short-term nominal interest rates if it has the
will to do so, any failure of such a commitment to be credible will not be due to skepticism
about whether the central bank is able to follow through on its commitment.
The richer dynamics of our model are also important for the analysis of optimal policy.
Krugman mainly addresses the question whether monetary policy is completely impotent
when the zero bound binds, and argues for the possibility of increasing real activity in the
6In the simple model presented here, this occurs solely as a result of intertemporal substitution in private
expenditure. But there are a number of reasons to expect long rates, rather than short rates, to be the
critical determinant of aggregate demand. For example, in an open-economy model, the real exchange rate
becomes an important determinant of aggregate demand. But the real exchange rate should be closely linked
to a very long domestic real rate of return (or alternatively, to the expected future path of short rates) as a
result of interest-rate parity, together with an anchor for the expected long-term real exchange rate (coming,
for example, from long-run purchasing-power parity).
6“liquidity trap” by creating expectations of inﬂation. This conclusion in itself, however (with
which we agree), does not answer the question whether, or to what extent, it should actually
be desirable to create such expectations, given the well-founded reasons that the central bank
should have to not prefer inﬂation at a later time. Nor is Krugman’s model well-suited to
address such a question, insofar as it omits any reason for even an extremely high degree of
subsequent inﬂation to be harmful. Our model with staggered pricing, instead, implies that
inﬂation (whether anticipated or not) creates distortions, and justiﬁes an objective function
for stabilization policy that trades oﬀ inﬂation stabilization and output-gap stabilization in
terms that are often assumed to represent actual central-bank concerns. We characterize
optimal policy in such a setting, and show that it does indeed involve a commitment to
history-dependent policy of a sort that should result in higher inﬂation expectations in
response to a binding zero bound. We can also show to what extent it should be optimal
to create such expectations, assuming that this is possible. We ﬁnd, for example, that it is
not optimal to commit to so much future inﬂation that the zero bound ceases to bind, even
though this is one possible type of equilibrium; this is why the zero bound does remain a
relevant constraint, even under an optimal policy commitment.
1 Is “Quantitative Easing” a Separate Policy Instru-
ment?
A ﬁrst question that we wish to consider is whether expansion of the monetary base represents
a policy instrument that should be eﬀective in preventing deﬂation and associated output
declines, even after overnight interest rates have fallen to zero. Speciﬁcally, we wish to
consider whether a policy of “quantitative easing” like that currently followed by the Bank
of Japan — conceived of as an additional aspect of policy, alongside the “zero interest-rate
policy” that continues to be maintained — should help to prevent further deﬂation. We
also wish to consider the extent to which it matters which sorts of assets may be acquired
by the central bank — that is, whether “unconventional” open-market operations should
be expected to be more eﬀective than simple purchases of short-term Treasury bills, as has
7often been suggested in recent discussion of U.S. policy options.
Here we consider this question in the context of an explicit intertemporal equilibrium
model, in which we model both the demand for money and the role of ﬁnancial assets
(including the monetary base) in private-sector budget constraints. The model that we use
for this purpose is more detailed in several senses than the one used in subsequent sections
to characterize optimal policy, in order to make it clear that we have not excluded a role
for “quantitative easing” simply by failing to model the role of money in the economy. The
model is discussed in more detail in Woodford (2003, chapter 4), where the consequences
of various interest-rate rules and money-growth rules are considered under the assumption
that disturbances are not large enough for the zero bound to bind.
Our key result is an irrelevance proposition for open market operations in a variety of
types of assets that might be acquired by the central bank, under the assumption that the
open market operations do not change the expected future conduct of monetary or ﬁscal
policy (in senses that we make precise below). It is perhaps worth stating from the start
that our intention in stating such a result is not to vindicate the view that a central bank
is powerless to halt a deﬂationary slump, and hence to absolve the Bank of Japan, for
example, from any responsibility for the continuing stagnation in that country. While our
proposition establishes that there is a sense in which a “liquidity trap” is possible, this
does not mean that the central bank is powerless under the circumstances that we describe.
Rather, the point of our result is to show that the key to eﬀective central-bank action to
combat a deﬂationary slump is the management of expectations. Open-market operations
should be largely ineﬀective to the extent that they fail to change expectations regarding
future policy; the conclusion that we draw is not that such actions are futile, but rather that
the central bank’s actions should be chosen with a view to signalling the nature of its policy
commitments, and not in order to create some sort of “direct” eﬀects.
81.1 A Neutrality Proposition for Open-Market Operations
Our model abstracts from endogenous variations in the capital stock, and assumes perfectly
ﬂexible wages (or some other mechanism for eﬃcient labor contracting), but assumes monop-
olistic competition in goods markets, and sticky prices that are adjusted at random intervals
in the way assumed by Calvo (1983), so that deﬂation has real eﬀects. We assume a model
























with an elasticity of substitution equal to µ > 1; Mt measures end-of-period household money









and Ht(j) is the quantity supplied of labor of type j. (Each industry j employs an industry-
speciﬁc type of labor, with its own wage wt(j):) Real balances are included in the utility
function, following Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1974, 1975), as a proxy for the services that
money balances provide in facilitating transactions.8
For each value of the disturbances »t; u(¢;¢;»t) is concave function, increasing in the ﬁrst
argument, and increasing in the second for all levels of real balances up to a satiation level
¯ m(Ct;»t): The existence of a satiation level is necessary in order for it to be possible for
the zero interest-rate bound ever to be reached; we regard Japan’s experience over the past
7We shall not introduce fractional-reserve banking into our model. Technically, Mt refers to the monetary
base, and we represent households as obtaining liquidity services from holding this base, either directly or
through intermediaries (not modelled).
8We use this approach to modelling the transactions demand for money because of its familiarity. As
shown in Woodford (2003, appendix section A.16), a cash-in-advance model leads to equilibrium conditions
of essentially the same general form, and the neutrality result that we present below would hold in essentially
identical form were we to model the transactions demand for money after the fashion of Lucas and Stokey
(1987).
9several years as having settled the theoretical debate over whether such a level of real balances
exists. Unlike many papers in the literature, we do not assume additive separability of the
function u between the ﬁrst two arguments; this (realistic) complication allows a further
channel through which money can aﬀect aggregate demand, namely an eﬀect of real money
balances on the current marginal utility of consumption. Similarly, for each value of »t; v(¢;»t)
is an increasing convex function. The vector of exogenous disturbances »t may contain several
elements, so that no assumption is made about correlation of the exogenous shifts in the
functions u and v.
For simplicity we shall assume complete ﬁnancial markets and no limits on borrowing
against future income. As a consequence, a household faces an intertemporal budget con-

















looking forward from any period t. Here Qt;T is the stochastic discount factor by which the
ﬁnancial markets value random nominal income at date T in monetary units at date t, ±t is
the opportunity cost of holding money (equal to it=(1 + it), where it is the riskless nominal
interest rate on one-period obligations purchased in period t, in the case that no interest
is paid on the monetary base), Wt is the nominal value of the household’s ﬁnancial wealth
(including money holdings) at the beginning of period t, Πt(i) represents the nominal proﬁts
(revenues in excess of the wage bill) in period t of the supplier of good i, wt(j) is the nominal
wage earned by labor of type j in period t, and T h
t represents the net nominal tax liabilities
of each household in period t.
Optimizing household behavior then implies the following necessary conditions for a
rational-expectations equilibrium. Optimal timing of household expenditure requires that








9For simplicity, we here abstract from government purchases of goods. Our equilibrium conditions directly
extend to the case of exogenous government purchases, as shown in Woodford (2003, chap. 4).
10where it is the riskless nominal interest rate on one-period obligations purchased in period t.
Optimal substitution between real money balances and expenditure leads to a static







under the assumption that zero interest is paid on the monetary base, and that preferences
are such that we can exclude the possibility of a corner solution with zero money balances.
If both consumption and liquidity services are normal goods, this equilibrium condition can
be solved uniquely for the level of real balances L(Yt;it;»t) that satisfy it in the case of any
positive nominal interest rate.10 The equilibrium relation can then equivalently be written




it ¸ 0; (1.4)
together with the “complementary slackness” condition that at least one must hold with
equality at any time. (Here we deﬁne L(Y;0;») = ¯ m(Y ;»); the minimum level of real
balances for which um = 0; so that the function L is continuous at i = 0:)
Household optimization similarly requires that the paths of aggregate real expenditure




TEt [uc(YT;MT=PT;»T)YT + um(YT;MT=PT;»T)(MT=PT)] < 1; (1.5)
lim
T!1¯
TEt[uc(YT;MT=PT;»T)DT=PT] = 0 (1.6)
looking forward from any period t, where Dt measures the total nominal value of govern-
ment liabilities (monetary base plus government debt) at the end of period t. under the
monetary-ﬁscal policy regime. (Condition (1.5) is required for the existence of a well-deﬁned
intertemporal budget constraint, under the assumption that there are no limitations on
households’ ability to borrow against future income, while the transversality condition (1.6)
10In the case that it = 0; L(Yt;0;»t) is deﬁned as the minimum level of real balances that would satisfy
the ﬁrst-order condition, so that the function L is continuous.
11must hold if the household exhausts its intertemporal budget constraint.) Conditions (1.2)
– (1.6) also suﬃce to imply that the representative household chooses optimal consumption
and portfolio plans (including its planned holdings of money balances) given its income ex-
pectations and the prices (including ﬁnancial asset prices) that it faces, while making choices
that are consistent with ﬁnancial market clearing.
Each diﬀerentiated good i is supplied by a single monopolistically competitive producer.
There are assumed to be many goods in each of an inﬁnite number of “industries”; the goods
in each industry j are produced using a type of labor that is speciﬁc to that industry, and
also change their prices at the same time. Each good is produced in accordance with a
common production function
yt(i) = Atf(ht(i));
where At is an exogenous productivity factor common to all industries, and ht(i) is the
industry-speciﬁc labor hired by ﬁrm i. The representative household supplies all types of
labor as well as consuming all types of goods.11
The supplier of good i sets a price for that good at which it supplies demand each period,
hiring the labor inputs necessary to meet any demand that may be realized. Given the
allocation of demand across goods by of households in response to ﬁrm pricing decisions, on
the one hand, and the terms on which optimizing households are willing to supply each type
of labor on the other, we can show that the nominal proﬁts (sales revenues in excess of labor
costs) in period t of the supplier of good i are given by a function
Π(pt(i);p
j












t is the common price charged by the other ﬁrms in industry j.12 (We introduce
the notation ˜ »t for the complete vector of exogenous disturbances, including variations in
11We might alternatively assume specialization across households in the type of labor supplied; in the
presence of perfect sharing of labor income risk across households, household decisions regarding consumption
and labor supply would all be as assumed here.
12In equilibrium, all ﬁrms in an industry charge the same price at any time. But we must deﬁne proﬁts
for an individual supplier i in the case of contemplated deviations from the equilibrium price.
12technology as well as preferences.) If prices were fully ﬂexible, pt(i) would be chosen each
period to maximize this function.
Instead we suppose that prices remain ﬁxed in monetary terms for a random period of
time. Following Calvo (1983), we suppose that each industry has an equal probability of
reconsidering its prices each period, and let 0 < ® < 1 be the fraction of industries with
prices that remain unchanged each period. In any industry that revises its prices in period t,
the new price p¤












We note furthermore that the stochastic discount factor used to price future proﬁt streams















Equations (1.7) and (1.9) jointly determine the evolution of prices given demand conditions,
and represent the aggregate-supply block of our model.
It remains to specify the monetary and ﬁscal policies of the government.13 In order to
address the question whether “quantitative easing” represents an additional tool of policy,
we shall suppose that the central bank’s operating target for the short-term nominal interest
rate is determined by a feedback rule in the spirit of the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993),
it = Á(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt; ˜ »t); (1.10)
13It is important to note that the speciﬁcation of monetary and ﬁscal policy in the particular way that we
propose here is not intended to suggest that either monetary or ﬁscal policy must be expected to be conducted
according to rules of the sort assumed here. Indeed, in later sections of this paper, we recommend policy
commitments on the part of both monetary and ﬁscal authorities that do not conform to the assumptions
made in this section. The point is to deﬁne what we mean by the qualiﬁcation that open-market operations
are irrelevant if they do not change expected future monetary or ﬁscal policy. In order to make sense of such
a statement, we must deﬁne what it would mean for these policies to be speciﬁed in a way that prevents
them from being aﬀected by past open-market operations. The speciﬁc classes of policy rules discussed here
show that our concept of “unchanged policy” is not only logically possible, but that it could correspond to
a policy commitment of a fairly familiar sort, one that would represent a commitment to “sound policy” in
the views of some.
13where now ˜ »t may also include exogenous disturbances in addition to the ones listed above,
to which the central bank happens to respond. We shall assume that the function Á is non-
negative for all values of its arguments (otherwise the policy would not be feasible, given
the zero lower bound), but that there are conditions under which the rule prescribes a zero
interest-rate policy. Such a rule implies that the central bank supplies the quantity of base
money that happens to be demanded at the interest rate given by this formula; hence (1.10)
implies a path for the monetary base, in the case that the value of Á is positive. However,
under those conditions in which the value of Á is zero, the policy commitment (1.10) implies
only a lower bound on the monetary base that must be supplied. In these circumstances, we
may ask whether it matters whether a greater or smaller quantity of base money is supplied.
We shall suppose that the central bank’s policy in this regard is speciﬁed by a base-supply
rule of the form
Mt = PtL(Yt;Á(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt; ˜ »t);»t)Ã(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt; ˜ »t); (1.11)
where the multiplicative factor Ã satisﬁes
(i) Ã(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt; ˜ »t) ¸ 1;
(ii) Ã(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt; ˜ »t) = 1 if Á(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt; ˜ »t) > 0
for all values of its arguments. (Condition (ii) implies that Ã = 1 whenever it > 0:) Note
that a base-supply rule of this form is consistent with both the interest-rate operating target
speciﬁed in (1.10) and the equilibrium relations (1.3) – (1.4). The use of “quantitative
easing” as a policy tool can then be represented by a choice of a function Ã that is greater
than 1 under some circumstances.
It remains to specify which sort of assets should be acquired (or disposed of) by the
central bank when it varies the size of the monetary base. We shall suppose that the asset
side of the central-bank balance sheet may include any of k diﬀerent types of securities,
distinguished by their state-contingent returns. At the end of period t; the vector of nominal
values of central-bank holdings of the various securities is given by Mt!m
t ; where !m
t is a





m(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt; ˜ »t); (1.12)
where the vector-valued function !m(¢) has the property that its components sum to 1 for
all possible values of its arguments. The fact that !m(¢) depends on the same arguments as
Á(¢) means that we allow for the possibility that the central bank changes its policy when the
zero bound is binding (for example, buying assets that it would not hold at any other time);
the fact that it depends on the same arguments as Ã(¢) allows us to specify changes in the
composition of the central-bank portfolio as a function of the particular kinds of purchases
associated with “quantitative easing.”
The payoﬀs on these securities in each state of the world are speciﬁed by exogenously
given (state-contingent) vectors at and bt and matrix Ft. A vector of asset holdings zt¡1
at the end of period t ¡ 1 results in delivery to the owner of a quantity a0
tzt¡1 of money,
a quantity b0
tzt¡1 of the consumption good, and a vector Ftzt¡1 of securities that may be
traded in the period t asset markets, each of which may depend on the state of the world in
period t. This ﬂexible speciﬁcation allows us to treat a wide range of types of assets that
may diﬀer as to maturity, degree of indexation, and so on.14
The gross nominal return Rt(j) on the jth asset between periods t¡1 and t is then given
by
Rt(j) =




where qt is the vector of nominal asset prices in (ex-dividend) period t trading. The absence














where the stochastic discount factor is again given by (1.8). Under the assumption that
no interest is paid on the monetary base, the nominal transfer by the central bank to the
14For example, security j in period t¡1 is a one-period riskless nominal bond if bt(j) and Ft(¢;j) are zero
in all states, while at(j) > 0 is the same in all states. Security j is instead a one-period real (or indexed)
bond if at(j) and Ft(¢;j) are zero, while bt(j) > 0 is the same in all states. It is a two-period riskless nominal
pure discount bond if instead at(j) and bt(j) are zero, Ft(i;j) = 0 for all i 6= k; Ft(k;j) > 0 is the same in
all states, and security k in period t is a one-period riskless nominal bond.







t¡1Mt¡1 ¡ Mt¡1; (1.15)
where Rt is the vector of returns deﬁned by (1.13).
We specify ﬁscal policy in terms of a rule that determines the evolution of total gov-
ernment liabilities Dt; here deﬁned to be inclusive of the monetary base, as well as a rule
that speciﬁes the composition of outstanding non-monetary liabilities (debt) among diﬀer-
ent types of securities that might be issued by the government. We shall suppose that the













which speciﬁes the acceptable level of real government liabilities as a function of the pre-
existing level of real liabilities and various aspects of current macroeconomic conditions.
This notation allows for such possibilities as an exogenously speciﬁed state-contingent target
for real government liabilities as a proportion of GDP, or for the government budget deﬁcit
(inclusive of interest on the public debt) as a share of GDP, among others.
The part of total liabilities that consists of base money is speciﬁed by the base rule (1.11).
We suppose, however, that the rest may be allocated among any of a set of diﬀerent types of
securities that may be issued by the government; for convenience, we assume that this is a
subset of the set of k securities that may be purchased by the central bank. If !
f
jt indicates
the share of government debt (i.e., non-monetary liabilities) at the end of period t that is of










where Bt ´ Dt ¡ Mt is the total nominal value of end-of-period non-monetary liabilities,
and T h
t is the nominal value of the primary budget surplus (taxes net of transfers, if we
abstract from government purchases). This identity can then be inverted to obtain the net
tax collections T h
t implied by a given rule (1.16) for aggregate public liabilities; this depends
in general on the composition of the public debt as well as on total borrowing.
16Finally, we suppose that debt management policy (i.e., the determination of the compo-





f(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt; ˜ »t); (1.17)
specifying the shares as a function of aggregate conditions, where the vector-valued function
!f also has components that sum to 1 for all possible values of its arguments. Together,
the two relations (1.16) and (1.17) complete our speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy, and close our
model.15





t g, with each endogenous variable speciﬁed as a function
of the history of exogenous disturbances to that date, that satisfy each of conditions (1.2) –
(1.6) of the aggregate-demand block of the model, conditions (1.7) and (1.9) of the aggregate-
supply block, the asset-pricing relations (1.14), conditions (1.10) – (1.12) specifying monetary
policy, and conditions (1.16) – (1.17) specifying ﬁscal policy each period. We then obtain
the following irrelevance result for the speciﬁcation of certain aspects of policy.
Proposition. The set of paths for the variables fp¤
t;Pt;Yt;it;qt;Dtg that are consistent
with the existence of a rational-expectations equilibrium are independent of the speciﬁcation
of the functions Ã in equation (1.11), !m in equation (1.12), and !f in equation (1.17).
The reason for this is fairly simple. The set of restrictions on the processes fp¤
t;Pt;Yt;it;qt;Dtg




and hence that does not involve the functions Ã, !m; or !f.
To show this, let us ﬁrst note that for all m ¸ ¯ m(C;»);
u(C;m;») = u(C; ¯ m(C;»);»);
15We might, of course, allow for other types of ﬁscal decisions from which we abstract here — government
purchases, tax incentives, and so on — some of which may be quite relevant to dealing with a “liquidity
trap.” But our concern here is solely with the question of what can be achieved by monetary policy; we
introduce a minimal speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy only for the sake of closing our general-equilibrium model,
and in order to allow discussion of the ﬁscal implications of possible actions by the central bank.
17as additional money balances beyond the satiation level provide no further liquidity services.
By diﬀerentiating this relation, we see further that uc(C;m;») does not depend on the exact
value of m either, as long as m exceeds the satiation level. It follows that in our equilibrium
relations, we can replace the expression uc(Yt;Mt=Pt;»t) by
¸(Yt;Pt=Pt¡1;»t) ´ uc(Yt;L(Yt;Á(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt;»t);»t);»t);
using the fact that (1.3) holds with equality at all levels of real balances at which uc depends
on the level of real balances. Hence we can write uc as a function of variables other than
Mt=Pt, without using the relation (1.11), and so in a way that is independent of the function
Ã:
We can similarly replace the expression um(Yt;Mt=Pt;»t)(Mt=Pt) that appears in (1.5)
by
¹(Yt;Pt=Pt¡1;»t) ´ um(Yt;L(Yt;Á(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt;»t);»t);»t)L(Yt;Á(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt;»t);»t);
since Mt=Pt must equal L(Yt;Á(Pt=Pt¡1;Yt;»t);»t) when real balances do not exceed the
satiation level, while um = 0 when they do. Finally, we can express nominal proﬁts in period




after substituting ¸(Yt;Pt=Pt¡1;»t) for the marginal utility of real income in the wage demand
function that is used (see Woodford, 2003, chapter 3) in deriving the proﬁt function Π: Using
these substitutions, we can write each of the equilibrium relations (1.2), (1.5), (1.6), (1.7),
and (1.14) in a way that no longer makes reference to the money supply.
It then follows that in a rational-expectations equilibrium, the variables fp¤
t;Pt;Yt;it;qt;Dtg











TEt [¸(YT;PT=PT¡1;»T)YT + ¹(YT;PT=PT¡1;»T)] < 1; (1.19)
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along with relations (1.9), (1.10), and (1.16) as before. Note that none of these equations
involve the variables fMt;!m
t ;!
f
t g, nor do they involve the functions Ã, !m; or !f:
Furthermore, this is the complete set of restrictions on these variables that are required
in order for them to be consistent with a rational-expectations equilibrium. For given any
processes fp¤
t;Pt;Yt;it;qt;Dtg that satisfy the equations just listed in each period, the implied
path of the money supply is given by (1.11), which clearly has a solution; and this path for
the money supply necessarily satisﬁes (1.3) and the complementary slackness condition, as a
result of our assumptions about the form of the function Ã: Similarly, the implied composition
of the central-bank portfolio and of the public debt at each point in time are given by (1.12)
and (1.17). We then have a set of processes that satisfy all of the requirements for a rational-
expectations equilibrium, and the result is established.
1.2 Discussion
This proposition implies that neither the extent to which quantitative easing is employed
when the zero bound binds, nor the nature of the assets that the central bank may pur-
chase through open-market operations, has any eﬀect on whether a deﬂationary price-level
path will represent a rational-expectations equilibrium. Hence the notion that expansions
of the monetary base represent an additional tool of policy, independent of the speciﬁca-
tion of the rule for adjusting short-term nominal interest rates, is not supported by our
general-equilibrium analysis of inﬂation and output determination. If the commitments of
policymakers regarding the rule by which interest rates will be set on the one hand, and
the rule which total private-sector claims on the government will be allowed to grow on the
other, are fully credible, then it is only the choice of those commitments that matters. Other
19aspects of policy should matter in practice, then, only insofar as they help to signal the
nature of policy commitments of the kind just mentioned.
Of course, the validity of our result depends on the reasonableness of our assumptions,
and these deserve further discussion. Like any economic model, ours abstracts from the
complexity of actual economies in many respects. This raises the question whether we may
have abstracted from features of actual economies that are crucial for a correct understanding
of the issues under discussion.
Many readers may suspect that an important omission is the neglect of “portfolio-balance
eﬀects,” which play an important role in much recent discussion of the policy options that
would remain available to the Fed in the event that the zero bound is reached by the federal
funds rate.16 The idea is that a central bank should be able to lower longer-term interest
rates even when overnight rates are already at zero, through purchases of longer-maturity
government bonds, shifting the composition of the public debt in the hands of the public
in a way that aﬀects the term structure of interest rates. (As it is generally admitted in
such discussions that base money and very short-term Treasury securities have become near-
perfect substitutes once short-term interest rates have fallen to zero, the desired eﬀect should
be achieved equally well by a shift in the maturity structure of Treasury securities held by
the central bank, without any change in the monetary base, as by an open-market purchase
of long bonds with newly created base money.)
There are evidently no such eﬀects in our model, resulting either from central-bank
securities purchases or debt management by the Treasury. But this is not, as some might
expect, because we have simply assumed that bonds of diﬀerent maturities (or for that
matter, other kinds of assets that the central bank might choose to purchase instead of the
shortest-maturity Treasury bills) are perfect substitutes. Our framework allows for diﬀerent
assets that the central bank may purchase to have diﬀerent risk characteristics (diﬀerent
state-contingent returns), and our model of asset-market equilibrium incorporates those term
premia and risk premia that are consistent with the absence of arbitrage opportunities.
16See, e.g., Clouse et al. (2003) and Orphanides (2003).
20Our conclusion diﬀers from the one in the literature on portfolio-balance eﬀects for a
diﬀerent reason. The classic theoretical analysis of portfolio-balance eﬀects assumes a rep-
resentative investor with mean-variance preferences. This has the implication that if the
supply of assets that pay oﬀ disproportionately in certain states of the world is increased
(so that the extent to which the representative investor’s portfolio pays oﬀ in those states
must also increase), the relative marginal valuation of income in those particular states is
reduced, resulting in a lower relative price for the assets that pay oﬀ in those states. But in
our general-equilibrium asset-pricing model, there is no such eﬀect. The marginal utility to
the representative household of additional income in a given state of the world depends on
the household’s consumption in that state, not on the aggregate payoﬀ of its asset portfolio in
that state. And changes in the composition of the securities in the hands of the public don’t
change the state-contingent consumption of the representative household — this depends on
equilibrium output, and while output is endogenous, we have shown that the equilibrium
relations that determine it do not involve the functions Ã; !m; or !f:17
Our assumption of complete ﬁnancial markets and no limits on borrowing against future
income may also appear extreme. However, the assumption of complete ﬁnancial markets is
only a convenience, allowing us to write the budget constraint of the representative household
in a simple way. Even in the case of incomplete markets, each of the assets that is traded
will be priced according to (1.14), where the stochastic discount factor is given by (1.8),
and once again there will be a set of relations to determine output, goods prices, and asset
prices that do not involve Ã;!m; or !f: The absence of borrowing limits is also innocuous, at
least in the case of a representative-household model, since in equilibrium the representative
household must hold the entire net supply of ﬁnancial claims on the government; as long as
the ﬁscal rule (1.16) implies positive government liabilities at each date, then, any borrowing
17Our general-equilibrium analysis is in the spirit of the irrelevance proposition for open-market operations
of Wallace (1981). Wallace’s analysis is often supposed to be of little practical relevance for actual monetary
policy because his model is one in which money serves only as a store of value, so that it is not possible for
there to be an equilibrium in which money is dominated in rate of return by short-term Treasury securities,
something that is routinely observed. However, in the case of open-market operations that are conducted at
the zero bound, the liquidity services provided by money balances at the margin have fallen to zero, so that
an analysis of the kind proposed by Wallace is correct.
21limits that might be assumed can never bind in equilibrium. Borrowing limits can matter
more in the case of a model with heterogeneous households. But in this case, the eﬀects of
open-market operations should depend not merely on which sorts of assets are purchased
and which sorts of liabilities are issued to ﬁnance the purchases, but also on the way in
which the central bank’s trading proﬁts are eventually rebated to the private sector (with
what delay, and how distributed across the heterogeneous households), as a result of the
speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy. The eﬀects will not be mechanical consequences of the change
in the composition of the assets in the hands of the public, but instead will result from
the ﬁscal transfers to which the transaction gives rise; and it is unclear how quantitatively
signiﬁcant such eﬀects should be.
Indeed, leaving aside the question of whether there exists a clear theoretical foundation
for the existence of portfolio-balance eﬀects, there is not a great deal of empirical support for
quantitatively signiﬁcant eﬀects. The attempt of the U.S. to separately target short-term and
long-term interest rates under “Operation Twist” in the early 1960’s is generally regarded as
having had a modest eﬀect at best on the term structure.18 The empirical literature that has
sought to estimate the eﬀects of changes in the composition of the public debt on relative
yields has also, on the whole, found eﬀects that are not quantitatively large when present at
all.19 For example, Agell and Persson (1992) summarize their ﬁndings as follows: “It turned
out that these eﬀects were rather small in magnitude, and that their numerical values were
highly volatile. Thus the policy conclusion to be drawn seems to be that there is not much
scope for a debt management policy aimed at systematically aﬀecting asset yields.”
Moreover, even if one supposes that large enough changes in the composition of the
portfolio of securities left in the hands of the private sector can substantially aﬀect yields,
it is not clear how relevant such an eﬀect should be for real activity and the evolution of
18Okun (1963) and Modigliani and Sutch (1967) are important early discussions that reached this conclu-
sion. Meulendyke (1998) summarizes the literature, and ﬁnds that the predominant view is that the eﬀect
was minimal.
19Examples of studies ﬁnding either no eﬀects or only quantitatively unimportant ones include Mogigliani
and Sutch (1967), Frankel (1985), Agell and Persson (1992), Wallace and Warner (1996), and Hess (1999).
Roley (1982) and Friedman (1992) ﬁnd somewhat larger eﬀects.
22goods prices. For example, Clouse et al. (2003) argue that a suﬃciently large reduction in the
number of long-term Treasuries in the hands of the public should be able to lower the market
yield on those securities relative to short rates, owing to the fact that certain institutions will
ﬁnd it important to hold long-term Treasury securities even when they oﬀer an unfavorable
yield.20 But even if this is true, the fact that these institutions have idiosyncratic reasons
to hold long-term Treasuries — and that, in equilibrium, no one else holds any or plays
any role in pricing them — means that the lower observed yield on long-term Treasuries
may not correspond to any reduction in the perceived cost of long-term borrowing for other
institutions. If one is able to reduce the long bond rate only by decoupling it from the rest of
the structure of interest rates, and from the cost of ﬁnancing long-term investment projects,
it is unclear that such a reduction should do much to stimulate economic activity or to halt
deﬂationary pressures.
Hence we are not inclined to suppose that our irrelevance proposition represents so poor
an approximation to reality as to deprive it of practical relevance. Even if the eﬀects of
open-market operations under the conditions described in the proposition are not exactly
zero, it seems unlikely that they should be large. In our view, it is more important to
note that our irrelevance proposition depends on an assumption that interest-rate policy is
speciﬁed in a way that implies that these open-market operations have no consequences for
interest-rate policy, either immediately (which is trivial, since it would not be possible for
them to lower current interest rates, which is the only eﬀect that would be desired), or at any
subsequent date either. We have also speciﬁed ﬁscal policy in a way that implies that the
contemplated open-market operations have no eﬀect on the evolution of total government
liabilities fDtg either — again, neither immediately nor at any later date. While we think
that these deﬁnitions make sense, as a way of isolating the pure eﬀects of open-market
purchases of assets by the central bank from either interest-rate policy on the one hand
and from ﬁscal policy on the other, it is important to note that someone who recommends
20Cecchetti (2003) similarly argues that it should be possible for the Fed to independently aﬀect long-bond
yields if it is determined to do so, given that it can print money without limit to buy additional long-term
Treasuries if necessary.
23monetary expansion by the central bank may intend for this to have consequences of one or
both of these other sorts.
For example, when it is argued that surely nominal aggregate demand could be stimulated
by a “helicopter drop of money”, the thought experiment that is usually contemplated is
not simply a change in the function Ã in our policy rule (1.11). First of all, it is typically
supposed that the expansion of the money supply will be permanent. If this is the case,
then the function Á that deﬁnes interest-rate policy is also being changed, in a way that will
become relevant at some future date, when the money supply no longer exceeds the satiation
level.21 Second, the assumption that the money supply is increased through a “helicopter
drop” rather than an open-market operation implies a change in ﬁscal policy as well. The
operation increases the value of nominal government liabilities, and it is generally at least
tacitly assumed that this is a permanent increase as well. Hence the experiment that is
imagined is not one that our irrelevance proposition implies should have no eﬀect on the
equilibrium path of prices.
Even more importantly, we should stress that our irrelevance result applies only given
a correct private-sector understanding of the central bank’s commitments regarding future
policy, which may not be present. We have just argued that the key to lowering long-term
interest rates, in a way that actually provides an incentive for increased spending, is by
changing expectations regarding the likely future path of short rates, rather than through
intervention in the market for long-term Treasuries. As a logical matter, this need not
require any open-market purchases of long-term Treasuries at all. Nonetheless, the private
sector may be uncertain about the nature of the central bank’s policy commitment, and so
may scrutinize the bank’s current actions for further clues. In practice, the management
21This explains the apparent diﬀerence between our result and the one obtained by Auerbach and Obstfeld
(2003) in a similar model. These authors assume explicitly that an increase in the money supply while the
zero bound binds carries with it the implication of a permanently higher money supply, and also that there
exists a future date at which the zero bound ceases to bind, so that the higher money supply will imply a
diﬀerent interest-rate policy at that later date. Clouse et al. (2003) also stress that maintenance of the higher
money supply until a date at which the zero bound would not otherwise bind represents one straightforward
channel through which open markets operations while the zero bound is binding could have a stimulative
eﬀect, though they discuss other possible channels as well.
24of private-sector expectations is an art of considerable subtlety, and shifts in the portfolio
of the central bank could be of some value in making credible to the private sector the
central bank’s own commitment to a particular kind of future policy, as we discuss further
in section 6. “Signalling” eﬀects of this kind are often argued to be an important reason
for the eﬀectiveness of interventions in foreign-exchange markets, and might well provide a
justiﬁcation for open-market policy when the zero bound binds.22
We do not wish, then, to argue that asset purchases by the central bank are necessarily
pointless under the circumstances of a binding zero lower bound on short-term nominal
interest rates. However, we do think it important to observe that insofar as such actions
can have any eﬀect, it is not because of any necessary or mechanical consequence of the
shift in the portfolio of assets in the hands of the private sector itself. Instead, any eﬀect
of such actions must be due to the way in which they change expectations regarding future
interest-rate policy, or, perhaps, the future evolution of total nominal government liabilities.
In sections 6 and 7 we discuss reasons why open-market purchases by the central bank might
plausibly have consequences for expectations of these types. But since it is only through
eﬀects on expectations regarding future policy that these actions can matter, we shall focus
our attention on the question of what kind of commitments regarding future policy are in
fact to be desired. And this question can be addressed without explicit consideration of the
role of open-market operations by the central bank of any kind. Hence we shall simplify
our model — abstracting from monetary frictions and the structure of government liabilities
altogether — and instead consider how it is desirable for interest-rate policy to be conducted,
and what kind of commitments about this policy it is desirable to make in advance.
2 How Severe a Constraint is the Zero Bound?
We turn now to the question of the way in which the existence of the zero bound restricts the
degree to which a central bank’s stabilization objectives, with regard to both inﬂation and
22Clouse et al. (2003) argue that this is one important channel through which open-market operations can
be eﬀective.
25real activity, can be achieved, even under ideal policy. It follows from our discussion in the
previous section that the zero bound does represent a genuine constraint. The diﬀerences
among alternative policies that are relevant to the degree to which stabilization objectives
are achieved having only to do with the implied evolution of short-term nominal interest
rates, and the zero bound obviously constrains the ways in which this instrument can be
used, though it remains to be seen how relevant this constraint may be.
Nonetheless, we shall see that it is not at all the case that there is nothing that a central
bank can do to mitigate the severity of the destabilizing impact of the zero bound. The
reason is that inﬂation and output do not depend solely upon the current level of short-term
nominal interest rates, or even solely upon the history of such rates up until the current
time (so that the current level of interest rates would be the only thing that could possibly
changed in response to an unanticipated disturbance). The expected character of future
interest-rate policy is also a critical determinant of the degree to which the central bank
achieves its stabilization objectives, and this allows an important degree of scope for policy
to be improved upon, even when there is little choice about the current level of short-term
interest rates.
In fact, the management of expectations is the key to successful monetary policy at all
times, and not just in those relatively unusual circumstances when the zero bound is reached.
The eﬀectiveness of monetary policy has little to do with the direct eﬀect of changing the level
of overnight interest rates, since the current cost of maintaining cash balances overnight is
of fairly trivial signiﬁcance for most business decisions. What actually matters is the private
sector’s anticipation of the future path of short rates, as this determines equilibrium long-
term interest rates, as well as equilibrium exchange rates and other asset prices — all of which
are quite relevant for many current spending decisions, hence for optimal pricing behavior as
well. The way in which short rates are managed matters because of the signals that it gives
about the way in which the private sector can expect them to be managed in the future.
But there is no reason to suppose that expectations regarding future monetary policy, and
hence expectations regarding the future evolution of nominal variables more generally, should
26change only insofar as the current level of overnight interest rates changes. A situation in
which there is no decision to be made about the current level of overnight rates (as in Japan
at present) is one which brings the question of what expectations regarding future policy
one should wish to create more urgently to the fore, but this is in fact the correct way to
think about sound monetary policy at all times.
Of course, there is no question to be faced about what future policy one should wish for
people to expect if there is no possibility of committing oneself to a diﬀerent sort of policy
in the future than one would otherwise have pursued, as a result of the constraints that are
currently faced (and that make desirable the change in expectations). This means that the
private sector must be convinced that the central bank will not conduct policy in a way that
is purely forward-looking, i.e., taking account at each point in time only of the possible paths
that the economy could follow from that date onward. For example, we will show that it
is undesirable for the central bank to pursue a certain inﬂation target, once the zero bound
is expected no longer to prevent it from being achieved, even in the case that the pursuit
of this target would be optimal if the zero bound did not exist (or would never bind under
an optimal policy). The reason is that an expectation that the central bank will pursue the
ﬁxed inﬂation target after the zero bound ceases to bind gives people no reason to hold the
kind of expectations, while the bound is binding, that would mitigate the distortions created
by it. A history-dependent inﬂation target23 — if the central bank’s commitment to it can
be made credible — can instead yield a superior outcome.
But this too is an important feature of optimal policy rules more generally (see, e.g.,
Woodford, 2003, chapter 7). Hence the analytical framework and institutional arrangements
used to make monetary policy need not be changed in any fundamental way in order to deal
with the special problems created by a “liquidity trap”. As we explain in section 4, the
optimal policy in the case of a binding zero bound can be implemented through a targeting
procedure that represents a straightforward generalization of a policy that would be optimal
23As we shall see, it is easier to explain the nature of the optimal commitment if it is described as a
history-dependent price-level target.
27even if the zero bound were expected never to bind.
2.1 Feasible Responses to Fluctuation in the Natural Rate of In-
terest
In order to characterize the way in which stabilization policy is constrained by the zero bound,
we shall make use of a log-linear approximation to the structural equations of section 2, of
a kind that is often employed in the literature on optimal monetary stabilization policy.24
Speciﬁcally, we shall log-linearize the structural equations of our model (except for the zero
bound (1.4)) around the paths of inﬂation, output and interest rates associated with a zero-
inﬂation steady state, in the absence of disturbances (»t = 0). We choose to expand around
these particular paths because the zero-inﬂation steady state represents optimal policy in
the absence of disturbances.25 In the event of small enough disturbances, optimal policy will
still involve paths in which inﬂation, output and interest rates are at all times close to those
of the zero-inﬂation steady state. Hence an approximation to our equilibrium conditions
that is accurate in the case of inﬂation, output and interest rates near those values will allow
an accurate approximation to the optimal responses to disturbances in the case that the
disturbances are small enough.
In the zero-inﬂation steady state, it is easily seen that the real rate of interest is equal to
¯ r ´ ¯¡1 ¡1 > 0; and this is also the steady-state nominal interest rate. Hence in the case of
small enough disturbances, optimal policy will involve a nominal interest rate that is always
positive, and the zero bound will not be a binding constraint. (Optimal policy in this case is
characterized in the references cited in the previous paragraph.) However, we are interested
in the case in which disturbances are at least occasionally large enough for the zero bound to
24See, e.g., Clarida et al., (1999) or Woodford (2003). Jung et al. (2001), Sugo and Teranishi (2003), and
Adam and Billi (2003) also consider optimal policy in the presence of the zero bound in frameworks like the
one used here.
25See Woodford (2003, chapter 7) for more detailed discussion of this point. The fact that zero inﬂation
is optimal, rather than mild deﬂation, depends on our abstracting from transactions frictions, as discussed
further in footnote xx below. As shown by Woodford, a long-run inﬂation target of zero is optimal in this
model, even when the steady-state output level associated with zero inﬂation is suboptimal, owing to market
power.
28bind, i.e., for it to prevent attainment of the outcome that would be optimal in the absence
of such a bound. A case in which it is possible to rigorously consider this problem using only
a log-linear approximation to the structural equations is that in which we suppose that the
lower bound on nominal interest is not much below ¯ r: We can arrange for this gap to be as
small as we may wish, without changing other crucial parameters of the model such as the
assumed rate of time preference, by supposing that interest is paid on the monetary base at
a rate im ¸ 0 that cannot (for some institutional reason) be reduced. Then the lower bound
on interest rates actually becomes
it ¸ i
m (2.1)
We shall characterize optimal policy subject to a constraint of the form (2.1), in the case
that both a bound on the amplitude of disturbances jj»jj and the size of the steady-state
opportunity cost of holding money ¯ ± ´ (¯ r ¡ im)=(1 + ¯ r) > 0 are small enough. Speciﬁcally,
both our structural equations and our characterization of the optimal responses of inﬂation,
output and interest rates to disturbances will be required to be exact only up to a resid-
ual of order O(jj»; ¯ ±jj2): We shall then hope (without here seeking to verify this) that our
characterization of optimal policy in the case of a small opportunity cost of holding money
and small disturbances is not too inaccurate in the case of an opportunity cost of several
percentage points (the case in which im = 0) and disturbances large enough to cause the
natural rate of interest to vary by several percentage points (as will be required in order for
the zero bound to bind).
As shown in Woodford (2003), the log-linear approximate equilibrium relations may be
29summarized by two equations each period,26 a forward-looking “IS relation”
xt = Etxt+1 ¡ ¾(it ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ r
n
t ); (2.2)
and a forward-looking “AS relation” (or “New Keynesian Phillips curve”)
¼t = ·xt + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut: (2.3)
Here ¼t ´ log(Pt=Pt¡1) is the inﬂation rate, xt is a welfare-relevant output gap, and it is
now the continuously compounded nominal interest rate (corresponding to log(1+it) in the
notation of section 2). The terms ut and rn
t are composite exogenous disturbance terms that
shift the two equations; the former is commonly referred to as a “cost-push disturbance”,
while the latter indicates exogenous variation in the Wicksellian “natural rate of interest”,
i.e., the equilibrium real rate of interest in the case that output is at all times equal to the
natural rate of output. The coeﬃcients ¾ and · are both positive, while 0 < ¯ < 1 is again
the utility discount factor of the representative household.
Equation (2.2) is a log-linear approximation to (1.2), while (2.3) is derived by log-
linearizing (1.7) – (1.9) and then eliminating log(p¤
t=Pt): We omit the log-linear version
of the money-demand relation (1.3), since we are here interested solely in characterizing the
possible equilibrium paths of inﬂation, output, and interest rates, and we may abstract from
the question of what the required path for the monetary base may be that is associated
with any such equilibrium in considering this. (It suﬃces that there exist a monetary base
26Here we omit the equilibrium relation implied by the government budget constraint. We assume the
existence of lump-sum taxes, so that the government budget constraint implies no additional restrictions on
the set of rational-expectations equilibria that can be brought about (assuming that ﬁscal policy is adjusted
appropriately, in order to be consistent with the optimal monetary policy). And in our positive analysis
of the consequences of alternative monetary policy rules, we assume a (locally) Ricardian ﬁscal policy, as
discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 4, sec. 4), so that intertemporal government solvency plays no role in
the determination of equilibrium inﬂation. Our conclusions do, however, depend on these assumptions. In
the case of a non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy which the central bank is unable to change, Iwamura and Watanabe
(2002) show that there is an equilibrium relation between current and expected future inﬂation, such that less
deﬂation immediately would require more deﬂation later — a result analogous to the “unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic” of Sargent and Wallace (1981). In this case, our conclusion that a commitment to a higher price-
level target in the future can reduce deﬂation immediately would not be correct. It must be understood in
all of our discussion below that our recommendations regarding monetary policy depend on the possibility
of a ﬁscal policy compatible with the equilibrium that the central bank seeks to achieve.
30that will satisfy the money-demand relation in each case, and this will be true as long as
the interest-rate bound is satisﬁed.) The other equilibrium requirements of section 2 can be
ignored in the case that we are interested only in possible equilibria that remain forever near
the zero-inﬂation steady state, as they are automatically satisﬁed in that case.
Equations (2.2) – (2.3) represent a pair of equations each period to determine inﬂation
and the output gap, given the central bank’s interest-rate policy. We shall seek to com-
pare alternative possible paths for inﬂation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate
that satisfy these two log-linear equations together with the inequality (2.1). Note that
our conclusions will be identical (up to a scale factor) in the event that we multiply the
amplitude of the disturbances and the steady-state opportunity cost ¯ ± by any common fac-
tor; alternatively, if we measure the amplitude of disturbances in units of ¯ ±, our results will
be independent of the value of ¯ ± (to the extent that our log-linear approximation remains
valid). Hence we choose the normalization ¯ ± = 1 ¡ ¯; corresponding to im = 0; to simplify
the presentation of our results. In the case, the lower bound for the nominal interest rate is
again given by (1.4).
2.2 Deﬂation under Forward-Looking Policy
We begin by considering the degree to which the zero bound impedes the achievement of
the central bank’s stabilization objectives in the case that the bank pursues a strict inﬂation
target. We interpret this as a commitment to adjust the nominal interest rate so that
¼t = ¼
¤ (2.4)
each period, insofar as it is possible to achieve this with some non-negative interest rate. It






When inﬂation is on target, the real rate is equal to the natural real rate at all times and
the output gap at its long run level. The zero bound, however, prevents (2.5) from holding














Figure 2: Dynamics of inﬂation and the output gap under strict inﬂation targeting, for three
alternative inﬂation targets.
if rn
t < ¡¼¤: Thus if the natural rate of interest is low, the zero bound frustrates the Central
Bank’s ability to implement an inﬂation target. Suppose the inﬂation target is zero so that
¼¤ = 0: Then the zero bound is binding if the natural rate of interest is negative, and the
Central Bank is unable to achieve its inﬂation target.
To illustrate this, let us consider the following experiment: Suppose the natural rate of
interest is unexpectedly negative in period 0 and reverts back to the steady-state value ¯ r > 0
with a ﬁxed probability in every period. Figure 2 shows the state-contingent paths of the
output gap and inﬂation in the case of three diﬀerent possible inﬂation targets ¼¤. In the
ﬁgure we assume in period 0 that the natural rate of interest becomes -2 percent per annum
and then reverts back to the steady-state value of +4 percent per annum with a probability
0.1 each quarter. Thus the natural rate of interest is expected to be negative for 10 quarters
on average at the time that the shock occurs.
32The dashed lines in Figure 2 show the state-contingent evolution of the output gap
and inﬂation if the central bank targets zero inﬂation.27 The ﬁrst dashed line shows the
equilibrium if the natural rate of interest returns back to steady state in period 1, the next
line if it returns in period 2, and so on. The inability of the central bank to set a negative
nominal interest rate results in a 12 percent per output gap and 9 percent annual deﬂation.
Since there is a 90 percent chance of the natural rate of interest to remain negative for
the next quarter, this creates expectation of future deﬂation and negative output gap which
creates even further deﬂation. Even if the central bank lowers the short-term nominal interest
rate to zero the real rate of return is positive because the private sector expects deﬂation.
The solid line in the ﬁgure shows the equilibrium if the central bank targets a one percent
inﬂation target. In this case the private sector expect one percent inﬂation once out of the
trap. This, however, is not enough to oﬀset the minus two percent negative natural rate of
interest, so that in equilibrium the private sector expect deﬂation instead of inﬂation. The
result of this and a negative natural rate of interest is 3 percent annual deﬂation (when the
natural rate of interest is negative) and an output gap of more than 5 percent.
Finally the dotted line shows the evolution of output and inﬂation if the central bank
targets 2 percent inﬂation. In this case the central bank can satisfy equation (3.14) even
when the natural rate of interest in negative. When the natural rate of interest is minus two
percent, the central bank lowers the nominal interest rate to zero. Since the inﬂation target
is two percent, the real rate is minus two percent, which is enough to close the output gap
and keep inﬂation on target. If the inﬂation target is high enough, therefore, the central bank
is able to accommodate a negative natural rate of interest. This is the argument given by
Phelps (1972), Summers (1991), and Fischer (1996) for a positive inﬂation target. Krugman
27In our numerical analysis, we interpret periods as quarters, and assume coeﬃcient values of ¾ = 0:5;
· = 0:02; and ¯ = 0:99: The assumed value of the discount factor implies a long-run real rate of interest
of ¯ r equal to four percent per annum, as noted in the text. The assumed value of · is consistent with the
empirical estimate of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The assumed value of ¾ represents a relatively low
degree of interest-sensitivity of aggregate expenditure. We prefer to bias our assumptions in the direction
of only a modest eﬀect of interest rates on the timing of expenditure, so as not to exaggerate the size of
the output contraction that is predicted to result from an inability to lower interest rates when the zero
bound binds. As Figure 2 shows, even for this value of ¾; the output contraction that results from a slightly
negative value of the natural rate of interest is quite substantial.
33(1998) makes a similar argument, and suggests more concretely that Japan needs a positive
inﬂation target of 4 percent under its current circumstances to achieve negative real rates
and curb deﬂation.
While we see that commitment to a higher inﬂation target will indeed guard against the
need for a negative output gap in periods when the natural rate of interest falls, the price of
this solution is the distortions created by the inﬂation, both when the natural rate of interest
is negative and under more normal circumstances as well. Hence the optimal inﬂation target
(from among the strict inﬂation targeting policies just considered) will be some value that
is at least slightly positive, in order to mitigate the distortions created by the zero bound
when the natural rate of interest is negative, but not so high as to keep the zero bound from
ever binding (see Table 1). In the case of an intermediate inﬂation target, however (like the
one percent target considered in the ﬁgure), there is both a substantial recession when the
natural rate of interest becomes negative, and chronic inﬂation at all other times. Hence no
such policy allows a complete solution of the problem posed by the zero bound in the case
that the natural rate of interest is sometimes negative.
Nor can one do better through commitment to any policy rule that is purely forward-
looking in the sense discussed by Woodford (2000). A purely forward-looking policy is one
under which the central bank’s action at any time depends only on an evaluation of the
possible paths for the central bank’s target variables (here, inﬂation and the output gap)
that are possible from the current date forward — neglecting past conditions except insofar
as they constrain the economy’s possible evolution from here on. In the log-linear model
presented above, the possible paths for inﬂation and the output gap from period t onward
depend only on the expected evolution of the natural rate of interest from period t onward. If
we assume a Markovian process for the natural rate, as in the numerical analysis above, then
any purely forward-looking policy will result in an inﬂation rate, output gap, and nominal
interest rate in period t that depend only on the natural rate in period t — in our numerical
example, on whether the natural rate is still negative or has already returned to its long-run
steady-state value. It is easily shown in the case of our 2-state example that the optimal
34state-contingent evolution for inﬂation and output from among those with this property will
be one in which the zero bound binds if and only if the natural rate is in the low state; hence
it will correspond to a strict inﬂation target of the kind just considered, for some ¼¤ between
zero and two percent.
But one can actually do considerably better, through commitment to a history-dependent
policy, in which the central bank’s actions will depend on past conditions even though these
are irrelevant to the degree to which its stabilization goals could in principle be achieved
from then on. We characterize the optimal form of history-dependent policy, and determine
the degree to which it improves upon the stabilization of both output and inﬂation, in the
next section.
2.3 The Optimal Policy Commitment
We now characterize optimal monetary policy. We do this by optimizing over the set of all
possible state-contingent paths for inﬂation, output and the short-term nominal interest rate
consistent with the log-linearized structural relations (2.2) and (2.3), under the assumption
(for now) that the expectations regarding future state-contingent policy that are required for
such an equilibrium can be made credible to the private sector. In considering the central
bank’s optimization problem under the assumption that credible commitment is possible
regarding future policy, we do not mean to minimize the subtlety of the task of actually
communicating such a commitment to the public and making it credible. However, we
do not believe that it makes sense to recommend a policy that would systematically seek
to achieve an outcome other than a rational-expectations equilibrium — that is, we are
interested in policies that will have the desired eﬀect even when correctly understood by
the public. Optimization under the assumption of credible commitment is simply a way of
ﬁnding the best possible rational-expectations equilibrium. Once the equilibrium that one
would like to bring about has been identiﬁed, along with the interest-rate policy that it
requires, one can turn to the question of how best to signal these intentions to the public
(an issue that we brieﬂy address in section 5 below).












This loss function can be derived by a second order Taylor expansion of the utility of the
representative household.28 The optimal program can be found by a Lagrangian method,
extending the methods used in Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (1999; 2003, chapter 7)
to the case in which the zero bound can sometimes bind, as shown by Jung et al. (2001).
Let us combine the zero bound and the IS equation to yield the inequality:
xt · Etxt+1 + ¾(r
n
t + Et¼t+1)












t] + Á1t[xt ¡ xt+1 ¡ ¾¼t+1 ¡ ¾r
n
t ] + Á2t[¼t ¡ ·xt ¡ ¯¼t+1]
¾
The ﬁrst order conditions for an optimal policy commitment are shown by Jung et al. to be:
¼t + Á2t ¡ Á2t¡1 ¡ ¯
¡1¾Á1t¡1 = 0 (2.7)
¸xt + Á1t ¡ ¯
¡1Á1t¡1 ¡ kÁ2t = 0 (2.8)
Á1t ¸ 0; it ¸ 0; Á1tit = 0 (2.9)
One can not apply standard solution methods for rational expectation models to solve this
system due to the complications of the nonlinear constraint (2.9). The numerical method
28See Woodford (2003, chapter 6) for details. This approximation applies in the case that we abstract from
monetary frictions as assumed in this section. If transactions frictions are instead non-negligible, the loss
function should include an additional term proportional to This would indicate welfare gains from keeping
nominal interest rates as close as possible to the zero bound (or, more generally, the lower bound im).
Nonetheless, because of the stickiness of prices, it would not be optimal for interest rates to be at zero at
all times, as implied by the ﬂexible-price model discussed by Uhlig (2000). The optimal inﬂation rate in the
absence of shocks would be slightly negative, rather than zero as in the “cashless” model considered in this
section; but it would not be so low that the zero bound would be reached, except in the event of temporary
declines in the natural rate of interest, as in the analysis here.
Note also that (2.6) implies that the optimal output gap is zero. More generally, there should be an
output-gap stabilization objective of the form (xt ¡ x¤)2; the utility-based loss function involves x¤ = 0
only if one assumes the existence of an output or employment subsidy that oﬀsets the distortion due to the
market power of ﬁrms. However, the value of x¤ does not aﬀect the optimal state-contingent paths derived
in this section and shown in ﬁgures 3 and 4, nor the formulas given in section 3 for the optimal targeting
rule.
36that we use to solve these equations is described in the appendix of Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003).29 Here we discuss the results that we obtain for the particular numerical experiment
considered in the previous section.
What is apparent from the ﬁrst order conditions (2.7)-(2.8) is that optimal policy is
history dependent, so that the optimal choice of inﬂation, the output gap and the nominal
interest rates depends on the past values of the endogenous variables. This can be seen by
the appearance of lagged value of the Lagrange multipliers in the ﬁrst order conditions. To
get a sense of how this history dependence matters, it is useful to consider the numerical
exercise from the last section: Suppose the natural rate of interest becomes negative in period
0 and then reverts back to steady state with a ﬁxed probability in each period.30
Figure 3 shows the optimal output gap, inﬂation and the price level from period 0 to
period 25. One observes that the optimal policy involves committing to the creation of an
output boom once the natural rate again becomes positive, and hence to the creation of
future inﬂation. Such a commitment stimulates aggregate demand and reduces deﬂationary
pressures while the economy remains in the “liquidity trap”, through each of several channels.
As Krugman (1998) points out, creating the expectation of future inﬂation can lower real
interest rates, even when the nominal interest rate cannot be reduced. In the context of
Krugman’s model, it might seem that this requires that inﬂation be promised quite quickly
(by the following “period”). Our fully intertemporal model shows how even the expectation
of later inﬂation — nominal interest rates are not expected to rise to oﬀset it — can stimulate
current demand, since in our model current spending decisions depend on real interest-rate
expectations far in the future. For the same reason, the expectation that nominal interest
rates will be kept low later, when the central bank might otherwise have raised them, will
29Jung et al. (2001) discuss the solution of these equations only for the case in which the number of
periods for which the natural rate of interest will be negative is known with certainty at the time that the
disturbance occurs. Here we show how the system can be solved in the case of a stochastic process for the
natural rate of a particular kind.
30Adam and Billi (2003) instead compute the equilibrium dynamics associated with optimal policy in the
case of empirically estimated disturbance processes for both the natural rate of interest and the “cost-push”
term in the aggregate-supply relation. Their general ﬁndings about the character of optimal policy are
similar to those obtained here.



















(c) the price level
Figure 3: Dynamics of the output gap and inﬂation under an optimal policy commitment.
also stimulate spending while the zero bound still binds. And ﬁnally, the expectation of
higher future income should stimulate current spending, in accordance with the permanent
income hypothesis. In addition, prices are less likely to fall, even given the current level of
real activity, insofar as future inﬂation is expected. This reduces the distortions created by
deﬂation itself.
On the other hand, these gains from the change in expectations during the “trap” can
be achieved (given rational expectations on the part of the private sector) only if the central
bank is expected to actually pursue the inﬂationary policy after the natural rate returns to its
normal level. This will in turn create distortions then, which limits the extent to which this
tool is used under an optimal policy. Hence some contraction of output and some deﬂation
occur during the period that the natural rate is negative, even under the optimal policy
commitment. It is also worth noting that while the optimal policy involves commitment to
a higher price level in the future, the price level will ultimately be stabilized. This is in









Figure 4: The associated state-contingent path of the short-term nominal interest rate, under
the policy shown in Figure 3 [solid line], and under the zero inﬂation target shown in Figure
2 [dashed line].
sharp contrast to a constant positive inﬂation target that would imply an ever-increasing
price level.
Figure 4 shows the corresponding state-contingent nominal interest rate under the op-
timal commitment, and contrasts it to the evolution of the nominal interest rate under a
zero inﬂation target. To increase inﬂation expectations in the trap, the central bank com-
mits to keeping the nominal interest rates at zero after the natural rate of interest becomes
positive again. In contrast, if the central bank targets zero inﬂation, it raises the nominal
interest rate as soon as the natural rate of interest becomes positive again. The optimal
commitment is an example of history-dependent policy, in which the central bank commits
to raise the interest rates slowly at the time the natural rate becomes positive in order to
aﬀect expectations when the zero bound is binding.



















Figure 5: Comparison of the state-contingent paths under the two policies compared in
Figure 4, in the case that the natural rate of interest is negative for 15 quarters.
The nature of the additional history-dependence of the optimal policy may perhaps be
more easily seen if we consider the evolution of inﬂation, output and interest rates under a
single possible realization of the random fundamentals. Figure 5 compares the equilibrium
evolution of all three variables, both under the zero inﬂation target and under optimal policy,
in the case that the natural rate of interest is negative for 15 quarters (t = 0 through 14),
though it is not known until quarter 15 that the natural rate will return to its normal level in
that quarter. Under the optimal policy, the nominal interest rate is kept at zero for ﬁve more
quarters (t = 15 through 19), whereas it immediately returns to its long-run steady-state
level in quarter 15 under the forward-looking policy. The consequence of the anticipation of
policy of this kind is that both the contraction of real activity and the deﬂation that occur
under the strict inﬂation target are largely avoided, as shown in the second and third panels
of the ﬁgure.
403 Implementing Optimal Policy
We turn now to the question of how policy should be conducted in order to bring about the
optimal equilibrium characterized in the previous section. The question of the implemen-
tation of optimal policy remains a non-trivial one, even after the optimal state-contingent
evolutions of all variables have been identiﬁed, for in general the solution obtained for the
optimal state-contingent path of the policy instrument (i.e., the short-term nominal interest
rate) does not represent in itself a useful description of a policy rule.31 For example, in
the context of the present model, a commitment to a state-contingent nominal interest-rate
path, even when fully credible, does not imply determinate rational-expectations equilibrium
paths for inﬂation and output; it is instead necessary for the central bank to be committed
(and understood to be committed) to a particular way of responding to deviations of inﬂa-
tion and the output gap from their desired evolution. Another problem is that a complete
description of the optimal state-contingent interest-rate path is unlikely to be feasible. In
the previous section, we showed that it is possible to characterize (at least numerically) the
optimal state-contingent interest-rate path in the case of one very particular kind of stochas-
tic process for the natural rate of interest. But a solution of this kind allowing for all the
possible states of belief about the probabilities of various future evolutions of the natural
rate (and disturbances to the aggregate-supply relation as well) would be diﬃcult to write
down, let alone to explain to the public.
Here we show that optimal policy can nonetheless be implemented through commitment
to a policy rule that speciﬁes the central bank’s short-run targets at each point in time as a
(fairly simple) function of what has occurred prior to that date.
How can the optimal policy be implemented? One may be tempted to believe that our
suggested policy is not entirely realistic or operational. Figures 3 and 4, for example, indicate
that the optimal policy involves a complicated state contingent plan for the nominal interest
rate, that may be hard to communicate to the public. Furthermore, it may appear that
31For further discussion in a more general context, see Woodford (2003, chapter 7).
41it depends on a knowledge of a special statistical process for the natural rate of interest,
that is in practice hard to estimate. Our discussion of the ﬁxed inﬂation target suggest that
the eﬀectiveness of increasing inﬂation expectation to close the output gap depends on the
diﬀerence between the announced inﬂation target and the natural rate of interest. It may,
therefore, seem crucial to estimate the natural rate of interest to implement the optimal
policy. Below we show the striking result that the optimal policy rule can be implemented
without any estimate or knowledge of the statistical process for the natural rate of interest.
This is an example of a robustly optimal direct policy rule of the kind discussed in Giannoni
and Woodford (2002) for the case of a general class of linear-quadratic policy problems. An
interesting feature of the present example is that we show how to construct an robustly
optimal rule in the same spirit, in a case where not all of the relevant constraints are linear
(owing to the fact that the zero bound binds at some times and not at others).
3.1 An Optimal Targeting Rule
To implement the rule proposed here, the central bank need only observe the price level and
the output gap. The rule suggested replicates exactly the history dependence discussed in
the last section. The rule is implemented as follows.
[i] In each and every period, there is a predetermined price-level target p¤
t: The Central
Bank chooses the interest rate it to achieve the target relation
´ ˜ pt = p¤
t (3.10)
if this is possible; if it is not possible, even by lowering the nominal interest rate to zero,
then it = 0: Here ˜ pt is an output-gap adjusted price index,32 deﬁned by




32On the desirability of a target for this index in the case that the zero bound does not bind, see Woodford
(2003, chapter 7). This would correspond to a nominal GDP target in the case that ¸ = ·; and that the
natural rate of output follows a deterministic trend. However, the utility-based loss function derived in
Woodford (2003, chapter 6) involves ¸ = ·=µ; where µ > 1 is the elasticity of demand faced by the suppliers
of diﬀerentiated goods, so that the optimal weight on output is considerably less than under a nominal GDP
target. Furthermore, the welfare-relevant output gap is unlikely to correspond too closely to deviations of
real GDP from a deterministic trend.








Figure 6: Responses of the price-level target and the gap-adjusted price level to a shock to
the natural rate of interest.






¡1(1 + ·¾)∆t ¡ ¯
¡1∆t¡1 (3.11)
where ∆t is the target shortfall in period t
∆t ´ p
¤
t ¡ ˜ pt: (3.12)
It can be veriﬁed that this rule does indeed achieve the optimal commitment solution. If the
price-level target is not reached, because of the zero bound, the central bank increases its
target for the next period. This, in turn, increases inﬂation expectations further in the trap,
which is exactly what is needed to reduce the real interest rate.
Figure 6 shows how the price-level target p¤
t would evolve over time, depending on the
43number of periods for which the natural rate of interest remains negative, in the same
numerical experiment as in Figure 3. (Here the solid lines show the evolution of the gap-
adjusted price level ˜ pt; while the dashed lines show the evolution of p¤
t:) One observes that
the target price level is ratcheted steadily higher during the period in which the natural
rate remains negative, as the actual price level continues to fall below the target by an
increasing amount. Once the natural rate of interest becomes positive again, the degree
to which the gap-adjusted price level undershoots the target begins to shrink, although the
target often continues to be undershot (as the zero bound continues to bind) for several more
quarters. (How long this is true depends on how high the target price level has risen relative
to the actual index; it will be higher the longer the time for which the natural rate has been
negative.) As the degree of undershooting begins to shrink, the price-level target begins to
fall again, as a result of the dynamics speciﬁed by (3.11). This hastens the date at which
the target can actually be hit with a non-negative interest rate. Once the target ceases to be
undershot, it no longer changes, and the central bank targets and achieves a new constant
value for the gap-adjusted price level ˜ pt, one slightly higher than the target in place before
the disturbance occurred.
Note that this approach to implementing optimal policy gives an answer to the question
whether there is any point in announcing an inﬂation target (or price-level target) if one
knows that it is extremely unlikely that in the short run it can be achieved, owing to the fact
that the zero bound is likely to continue to bind. The answer here is yes. The central bank
wishes to make the private sector aware of its commitment to the time-varying price-level
target described by (3.10) – (3.12), since eventually it will be able to hit the target, and
the anticipation of that fact (i.e., of the level that the price level will eventually reach, as a
result of the policies that the bank will follow after the natural rate of interest again becomes
positive) while the natural rate is still negative is important in mitigating the distortions
caused by the zero bound. The fact that the target is not hit immediately should not create
doubts about the meaningfulness of central-bank announcements regarding its target, if it
is explained that the bank is committed to hitting the target if this is possible at a non-
44negative interest rate, so that at each point in time, either the target will be attained or a
zero-interest-rate policy will be followed. The existence of the target is relevant even when
it is not being attained, as it allows the private sector to judge how close the central bank
is to a situation in which it would feel justiﬁed in abandoning the zero-interest-rate policy;
hence the current gap between the actual and target price level should shape private-sector
expectations of the time for which interest rates are likely to remain low.33
Would the private sector have any reason to believe that the central bank was serious
about the price-level target, if each period all that is observed is a zero nominal interest rate
and yet another target shortfall? The best way of making a rule credible is for the central
bank to conduct policy over time in a way that demonstrates its commitment. Ideally, the
central bank’s commitment to the price-level targeting framework would be demonstrated
before the zero bound came to bind (at which time the central bank would have frequent
opportunities to show that the target did determine its behavior). The rule proposed above is
one that would be equally optimal under normal circumstances as in the case of the relatively
unusual kind of disturbance that causes the natural rate of interest to be substantially
negative.
To understand how the rule works out of the trap it is useful to note that when the
nominal interest rate is positive, ∆t = 0 at all times. The central bank, therefore, should
demonstrate a commitment to subsequently undo overshoots and undershoots of the price-
level target. In this case, deﬂation that occurs when the economy ﬁnds itself in a liquidity
trap should create expectations of future inﬂation, as mandated by optimal policy. The
additional term ∆t implies that when the zero bound is binding, the central bank should
raise its long-run price-level target even further, thus increasing inﬂation expectations even
33An interesting feature of the optimal rule is that it involves history-dependence that cannot be summa-
rized solely by the outcomes that the central bank has been able to achieve in the past; it matters to what it
extent the zero bound has prevented the central bank from pursuing as stimulative a policy as it otherwise
would have done. In this respect, the optimal policy rule derived here is similar to the rules advocated
by Reifschneider and Williams (2000), under which the interest-rate operating target at each point in time
should depend on how low the central bank would have lowered interest rates in the past had the zero bound
not prevented this. Sugo and Teranishi (2003) show that optimal policy rules are of the form discussed by
Reifschneider and Williams, in the context of a model of the transmission mechanism like that analyzed
here, though with a diﬀerent assumption about the goals of stabilization policy.
45more.
It may be wondered why we discuss our proposal in terms of a (gap-adjusted) price-level
target, rather than an inﬂation target. In fact, we could equivalently describe the policy in
terms of a time-varying target for the gap-adjusted inﬂation rate ˜ ¼t ´ ˜ pt ¡ ˜ pt¡1: The reason
that we prefer to describe the rule as a price-level targeting rule is that the essence of the
rule is easily described in those terms. As we show below, a ﬁxed target for the gap-adjusted
price level would actually represent quite a good approximation to optimal policy, whereas
a ﬁxed inﬂation target would not come close, as it would fail to allow for any of the history-
dependence of policy that is necessary to mitigate the distortions resulting from the zero
bound.
3.2 A Simpler Proposal
One may argue that an unappealing aspect of the rule suggested above is that it involves the
term ∆t; which determines the change in the price-level target, and is only non-zero when
the zero bound is binding. Suppose that the central bank’s commitment to a policy rule
can only become credible over time through repeated demonstrations of its commitment to
act in accordance with it. In that case, the part of the rule that involves the adjustment of
the target in response to target shortfalls when the zero bound binds might not come to be
understood well by the private sector for a very long time, since the occasions on which the
zero bound binds will presumably be relatively infrequent.
Fortunately, most of the beneﬁts that can be achieved in principle through a credible
commitment to the optimal targeting rule can be achieved through commitment to a much
simpler rule, which would not involve any special provisos that are invoked only in the event






where now the target for the gap-adjusted price level is ﬁxed at all times. The advantage of
this rule, although not fully optimal when the zero bound is binding, is that it may be more
46easily communicated to the public. Note that the simple rule is fully optimal in the absence
of the zero bound. In fact, even if the zero bound occasionally binds, this rule results in
distortions only a bit more severe than those associated with the fully optimal policy.
Figure 7 and 8 compares the result for these two rules. The dotted line shows the
equilibrium under the constant price-level target rule in (3.13) whereas the solid line shows
the fully optimal rule in (3.10)-(3.12). As the ﬁgures show, the constant price-level targeting
rule results in state-contingent responses of output and inﬂation that are very close to those
under the optimal commitment, even if under this rule the price level falls farther during the
period while the zero bound binds, and only asymptotically returns from below to the level
that it had prior to the disturbance. Table 1 shows that most of the welfare gain achieved
by the optimal policy, relative to what can be achieved by a purely forward-looking policy
such as a strict inﬂation target, is already achieved by the simple rule. The table reports the
value of expected discounted losses (2.6), conditional on the occurrence of the disturbance in
period zero, under the three policies shown in Figure 2, the optimal policy characterized in
Figure 3, and under the constant price-level targeting rule. Both of the latter two history-
dependent policies are vastly superior to any of the strict inﬂation targets. While it is true
that losses remain twice as large under the simple rule as under the optimal rule, we are
referring to fairly small losses at this point.
As with the fully optimal rule, no estimate of the natural rate of interest is needed to
implement the constant price-level targeting rule. At ﬁrst, it may seem puzzling that a
constant price-level targeting rule does well, since no account is taken of the size of the
disturbance to the natural rate of interest. This is because a price-level target commits the
central bank to undo any deﬂation by subsequent inﬂation; a larger disturbance, that creates
a larger initial deﬂation, automatically creates greater inﬂation expectations in response.
Thus there is an “automatic stabilizer” built into the price-level target, that is lacking under
a strict inﬂation targeting regime.34
34Wolman (2003) also stresses this advantage of rules that incorporate a price-level target over rules that
only respond to the inﬂation rate, such as a conventional Taylor rule.
















Figure 7: State-contingent paths of inﬂation and the output gap under the optimal targeting
rule [solid lines] and under the simple rule [dotted lines].
A proper communication strategy for the central bank about its objectives and targets
when outside the trap is of crucial importance for this policy rule to be successful. To see
this, consider a rule that is equivalent to (3.13) when the zero bound is not binding. Taking




(xt ¡ xt¡1) = 0 (3.14)
Although this rule results in an identical equilibrium to the constant price-level targeting
rule when the zero bound is not binding, the result is dramatically diﬀerent when the zero
bound is binding. This is because this rule implies that the inﬂation rate is proportional to
the negative of the growth rate of the output gap. Thus it mandates deﬂation when there
is growth in the output gap. This implies that the central bank will deﬂate once out of a
liquidity trap since this is a period of output growth. This is exactly opposite to what is
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Figure 8: State-contingent paths of the nominal interest rate and the price level under the
same two policies as in Figure 7.
optimal as we have observed above. Thus the outcome under this rule is even worse than a
strict zero inﬂation target, even if this rule replicates the price level targeting rule when out of
the trap. What this underlines is that it is not enough to replicate the equilibrium behavior
that correspond to (3.13) at normal times to induce the correct set of expectations when
the zero bound is binding. It is crucial to communicate to the public that the government
is committed to a long-run price-level target. This commitment is exactly what creates the
desired inﬂation expectations when the zero bound is binding.
4 Preventing a Self-Fulﬁlling Deﬂationary Trap
In our analysis thus far, we have assumed that the real disturbance results in a negative
natural rate of interest only temporarily. We have therefore supposed that price-level sta-
bilization will eventually be consistent with positive nominal interest rates, and accordingly
49Table 1: Relative losses under alternative policies [loss under zero inﬂation target = 100].
Strict Inﬂation Targets
¼¤ = 0 100
¼¤ = 1 25.5




that a time will foreseeably be reached at which it is possible for the central bank to create
inﬂation by keeping short-term nominal rates at a low (but non-negative) level. Some may
ask, however, if it is not possible for the zero bound to bind forever in equilibrium, not
because of a permanently negative natural rate, but simply because deﬂation continues to
be (correctly) expected indeﬁnitely. If so, it might seem that the central bank’s commit-
ment to a non-decreasing price-level target would be irrelevant; the actual price level would
fall further and further short of the target, but because of the binding zero bound, there
would never be anything the central bank could do about this. Our proposed approach to
the conduct of monetary policy might then be subject to a criticism similar to the one that
Benhabib et al., (2001) levy against the “Taylor rule” (Taylor, 1993) as a guide to policy —
while it may be consistent with a desirable equilibrium, it cannot ensure that a bad outcome
(perpetual deﬂation) will not occur instead.
In the model presented in section 2, a self-fulﬁlling permanent deﬂation is indeed con-
sistent with both the Euler equation (1.2) for aggregate expenditure, the money-demand
relation (1.3) and the pricing relations (1.7) – (1.9). Suppose that from some date ¿ onward,
all disturbances »t = 0 with certainty, so that the natural rate of interest is expected to take
the constant value ¯ r = ¯¡1¡1 > 0; as in the scenarios considered in section 3. Then possible
paths for inﬂation, output, and interest rates consistent with each of the relations just listed
in all periods t ¸ ¿ is given by
it = 0;
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p
¤








Yt = ˜ Y
for all t ¸ ¿; where ˜ Y < ¯ Y is implicitly deﬁned by the relation
Π1(˜ p
¤; ˜ p
¤;1; ˜ Y ; ¯ m(˜ Y ;0);0) = 0:
Note that this deﬂationary path is consistent with monetary policy as long as real balances
satisfy Mt=Pt ¸ ¯ m(˜ Y ;0) each period; faster growth of the money supply does nothing
to prevent consistency of this path with the requirement that money supply equal money
demand each period.
There remains, however, one further requirement for equilibrium in the model of section 2,
the transversality condition (1.6), or equivalently the requirement that households exhaust
their intertemporal budget constraints. Whether the deﬂationary path is consistent with
this condition as well depends, properly speaking, on the speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy: it is
a matter of whether the government budget results in contraction of the nominal value of
total government liabilities Dt at a suﬃcient rate asymptotically. Under some assumptions
about the character of ﬁscal policy, such as the “Ricardian” ﬁscal policy rule assumed by
Benhabib et al., the nominal value of government liabilities will necessarily contract along
with the price level, so that (1.6) is also satisﬁed, and the processes described above will
indeed represent a rational-expectations equilibrium. In such a case, then, a commitment to
the price-level targeting rule proposed in the previous section will be equally consistent with
more than one equilibrium: if people expect the optimal price-level process characterized
earlier, then that will indeed be an equilibrium, but if they expect perpetual deﬂation, this
will be an equilibrium as well.
We can, however, exclude this outcome through a suitable commitment with regard to
the asymptotic evolution of total government liabilities. Essentially, there needs to be a
commitment to policies that ensure that the nominal value of government liabilities cannot
51contract at the rate required for satisfaction of the transversality condition despite perpetual
deﬂation. One example of a commitment that would suﬃce is a commitment to a balanced-
budget policy of the kind analyzed by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000). These authors show
that self-fulﬁlling deﬂations are not possible under commitment to a Taylor rule, together
with the balanced-budget ﬁscal commitment. The key to their result is that the ﬁscal rule
includes a commitment not to allow budget surpluses any more than budget deﬁcits would
be allowed; hence it is not possible for the nominal value of government liabilities to contract,
even when the price level falls exponentially forever.
The credibility of this sort of ﬁscal commitment might be doubted, and so it is worth
mentioning that another way of maintaining a ﬂoor on the asymptotic nominal value of total
government liabilities is through a commitment not to contract the monetary base, together
with a commitment of the government to maintain a non-negative asymptotic present value
of the public debt. In particular, suppose that the central bank commits itself to follow a
base-supply rule of the form
Mt = P
¤
t ¯ m(Yt;»t) (4.1)
in each period when the zero bound binds (i.e., when it is not possible to hit the price-level












is the current price-level target implied by the adjusted price-level target p¤
t: When the
zero bound does not bind, the monetary base is whatever level is demanded at the nominal
interest rate required to hit the price-level target. This is a rule in the same spirit as (1.11),
specifying a particular level of excess supply of base money in the case that the zero bound
binds, but letting the monetary base be endogenously determined by the central bank’s other
targets at all other times. Equation (4.1) is a more complicated formula than is necessary to
make our point, but it has the advantage of making the monetary base a continuous function
of other aggregate state variables at the point where the zero bound just ceases to bind.
This particular form of commitment has the advantage that it may be considered less
52problematic for the central bank to commit itself to maintain a particular nominal value for
its liabilities than for the Treasury to do so. It can also be justiﬁed as a commitment that is
entirely consistent with the central bank’s commitment to the price-level targeting rule; even
when the target cannot be hit, the central bank supplies the quantity of money that would
be demanded if the price level were at the target level. Doing so — refusing to contract the
monetary base even under circumstances of deﬂation — is a way of signalling to the public
that the bank is serious about its intention to see the price level restored to the target level.
If we then assume a ﬁscal commitment that guarantees that
lim
T!1EtQt;TBT = 0; (4.2)
i.e., that the government will asymptotically be neither creditor nor debtor, the transversality
condition (1.6) reduces to
lim
T!1¯
TEt[uc(YT;MT=PT;»T)MT=PT] = 0: (4.3)
In the case of the base-supply rule (4.1), this condition is violated in the candidate equilibrium
described above, since the price-level and output paths speciﬁed would imply that
¯
TEt[uc(YT;MT=PT;»T)MT=PT] = ¯




¿uc(˜ Y ; ¯ m(˜ Y ;0);0)¯ m(˜ Y ;0)P
¤
¿ =P¿;
where the last inequality makes use of the fact that under the price-level targeting rule,
fp¤
tg is a non-decreasing series. Note that the ﬁnal expression on the right-hand side is
independent of T, for all dates T ¸ ¿: Hence the series is bounded away from zero, and
condition (4.3) is violated.
Thus a commitment of this kind can exclude the possibility of a self-fulﬁlling deﬂation
of the sort described above as a possible rational-expectations equilibrium. It follows that
there is a possible role for “quantitative easing” — understood to mean supply of base money
beyond the minimum quantity required for consistency with the zero nominal interest rate
— as an element of an optimal policy commitment. A commitment to supply base money
53in proportion to the target price level, and not the actual current price level, in a period in
which the zero bound prevents the central bank from hitting its price-level target, can be
desirable both as a way of ruling out self-fulﬁlling deﬂations and as a way of signalling the
central bank’s continuing commitment to the price-level target, even though it is temporarily
unable to hit it.
Note that this result does not contradict the irrelevance proposition of section 2, for
we have here made a diﬀerent assumption about the nature of the ﬁscal commitment than
the one made in section 2. Condition (4.2) implies that the evolution of total nominal
government liabilities will not be independent of the central bank’s target for the monetary
base. As a consequence, the neutrality proposition of section 2 no longer holds. The import
of that proposition is that expansion of the monetary base when the economy is in a liquidity
trap is necessarily pointless; rather, it is that any eﬀect of such action must depend either
on changing expectations regarding future interest-rate policy or on changing expectations
regarding the future evolution of total nominal government liabilities. The present discussion
has illustrated circumstances under which expansion of the monetary base — or at any rate,
a commitment not to contract it — could serve both of these ends.
Nonetheless, the present discussion does not support the view that the central bank
should be able to hit its price-level target at all times, simply by ﬂooding the economy with
as much base money as is required to prevent the price level from falling below the target
at any time. Our analysis in section 3 still describes all of the possible paths for the price
level consistent with rational-expectations equilibrium, and we have seen that even if the
central bank were able to choose the expectations that the private sector should have (as
long as it were willing to act in accordance with them), the zero bound would prevent it from
being able to fully stabilize inﬂation and the output gap. Furthermore, the degree of base
expansion during a “liquidity trap” called for by rule (4.1) is quite modest. The monetary
base will be gradually raised, if the zero bound continues to bind, as the price-level target
is ratcheted up to steadily higher levels. But our calibrated example above indicates that
this would typically involve only quite a modest increase in the monetary base, even in the
54case of a “liquidity trap” that lasts for several years. There would be no obvious beneﬁt
to the kind of rapid expansion of the monetary base actually tried in Japan over the past
two years. An expansion of the monetary base of this kind is evidently not justiﬁed by any
intentions regarding the future price level, and hence regarding the size of the monetary base
once Japan exits from the “trap.” But an injection of base money that is expected to be
removed again once the zero bound ceases to bind should have little eﬀect on spending or
pricing behavior, as shown in section 2.
5 Further Aspects of the Management of Expectations
In section 2, we argued that neither expansion of the monetary base as such nor purchases
of particular types of assets through open-market purchases should have any eﬀect on either
inﬂation or real activity, except to the extent that such actions might result in changes
in expectations regarding future interest-rate policy (or possibly expectations regarding
the asymptotic behavior of total nominal government liabilities, and hence the question
of whether the transversality condition should be satisﬁed). Because of this, we were able,
in sections 3 and 4, to characterize the optimal policy commitment without any reference
to the use of such instruments of policy; a consideration of the diﬀerent possible joint paths
of interest rates, inﬂation and output that would be consistent with rational-expectations
equilibrium suﬃced to allow us to determine the best possible equilibrium that one could
hope to arrange, and to characterize it in terms of the interest-rate policy that one should
wish for the private sector to expect.
However, this does not mean that other aspects of policy — beyond a mere announcement
of the rule according to which the central bank wishes to be understood to be committed
in setting future interest-rate policy — cannot matter. They may matter insofar as certain
kinds of present actions may help to signal what the bank’s intentions regarding future
policy are, or may make it more credible that the central bank will indeed carry out these
intentions. A full analysis of the ways in which policy actions may be justiﬁed as helping
to steer expectations is beyond the scope of this article, and in any event the question is
55one that has as much to do with psychology and eﬀective communication as with economic
analysis. Nonetheless, we oﬀer a few remarks here about the kinds of policies that might
contribute to the creation of desirable expectations.
5.1 Demonstrating Resolve
One way in which current actions may help to create desirable expectations regarding future
policy is by being seen to be consistent with the same principles that the central bank
wishes the private sector to understand will guide its policy in the future. We have already
mentioned one example of this, when we remarked that one way to convince the private
sector that the central bank will follow the optimal price-level targeting rule following a
period in which the zero bound has been hit is by following this rule before such a situation
arises.
Our discussion in the previous section provides a further example. Adjustment of the
supply of base money during the period in which the zero bound binds so as to keep the
monetary base proportional to the target price level rather than the actual current price level
can be helpful, even though it is irrelevant as far as interest-rate control is concerned, as a
way of making visible to the private sector the central bank’s belief about whether the price
level ought properly to be (and hence, the quantity of base money that the economy ought
to need). By making the existence of the price-level target more salient, such an action can
help to create the expectations regarding future interest-rate policy that are necessary in
order to mitigate the distortions created by the binding zero bound.
As a further example, Clouse at al. (2003) argue that open-market operations may be
stimulative, even when the zero bound has been reached, because they “demonstrate resolve”
to keep the nominal interest rate at zero for a longer time than would otherwise be expected.
Here it should be remarked that an expansion of the monetary base when the zero bound is
binding need not be interpreted in this way. Consider, for example, a central bank with a
constant zero inﬂation target, as discussed in section 2.2. When the zero bound binds, such
a bank is unable to hit its inﬂation target, and should exhibit frustration with this state of
56aﬀairs. If some within the bank believe that it should always be possible to hit the target
with suﬃciently vigorous monetary expansion, one might well observe substantial growth
in the monetary base at a time when the inﬂation target is being undershot. Nonetheless,
this would not imply any commitment to looser policy subsequently; such a central bank
would never intentionally allow the monetary base to be higher than that required to hit
the inﬂation target, in a period in which it is possible to hit it. The result should be the
equilibrium evolution shown in Figure 2, and no eﬀect of the “quantitative easing” that
occurs while the zero bound binds. This shows that it matters what the private sector
understands to be the principle that motivates “quantitative easing”, and not simply the
size of the increase in the monetary base that occurs.
Similarly, open-market purchases of long-term Treasuries when short rates are at zero,
as advocated by Bernanke (2002) and Cecchetti (2003), among others, may well have a
stimulative eﬀect even if portfolio-balance eﬀects are quantitatively unimportant. We have
argued in sections 2 and 3 that it is desirable for the central bank to commit itself under such
circumstances to maintain low short-term rates even after the natural rate of interest rises
again. The level of long rates can provide an indicator of the extent to which the markets
actually believe in such a commitment. If a central bank’s judgment is that long rates
are remaining higher than they should be under the optimal equilibrium owing to private-
sector skepticism about whether the history-dependent interest-rate policy will actually be
followed, then a willingness to buy long bonds from the private sector at a price which it
regards as more appropriate is one of way of demonstrating publicly that it expects to carry
out its commitment regarding future interest-rate policy. Given that the private sector is
likely to be uncertain about the nature of the central bank’s commitment (in the case of
imperfect credibility), and that it can reasonably assume that the central bank knows more
about its own degree of resolve than others do, action by the central bank that is consistent
with a belief on its own part that it will keep short rates low in the future is likely to shift
private beliefs in the same direction. If so, open-market purchases of long bonds could lower
long-term interest rates, stimulate the economy immediately, and bring the economy closer
57to the optimal rational-expectations equilibrium. Note, however, that the eﬀect follows, not
from the purchases themselves, but from the way in which they are interpreted. In order for
them to be interpreted as indicating a particular kind of commitment with regard to future
policy, it is important that the central bank have itself formulated such an intention, and
that it speak about it to the public, so that its open-market purchases will be seen in this
light.
Similar remarks apply to the proposals by McCallum (2000) and Svensson (2001) that
purchases of foreign exchange be used to stimulate the economy through devaluation of the
exchange rate.35 Under the optimal policy commitment described in section 2, a decline in
the natural rate of interest should be accompanied by depreciation of the exchange rate,
both because nominal interest rates fall (and are expected to remain low for some time) and
because the expected long-run price level (and hence the expected long-run nominal exchange
rate) should increase. It follows that the extent to which the exchange rate depreciates can
provide an indicator of the extent to which the markets believe that the central bank is
committed to such the optimal policy; and if the depreciation is insuﬃcient, purchases of
foreign exchange by the central bank provide one way for it to demonstrate its own conﬁdence
in its policy intentions. Again, the eﬀect in question is not a mechanical consequence of the
bank’s purchases, but instead depends on their interpretation.36 Furthermore, explaining
the goals of the intervention in terms of bringing about an exchange rate consistent with a
price-level target, rather than in terms of an exchange rate target that is presented as an
end in itself, would allow a country to answer possible charges by its trading partners that
it is seeking simply to “export deﬂation” to them. For while an exchange-rate depreciation
can obviously not be achieved without another country’s having to accept an exchange rate
35Svensson’s proposal includes a target path for the price level, which the exchange-rate policy is used to
(eventually) achieve, and in this respect is similar to the policy advocated here. The connection is made
more explicit in Svensson (2003), where an announced path for the exchange rate is proposed as a way of
creating the expectations regarding the future price level associated with the optimal equilibrium.
36The numerical analysis by Coenen and Wieland (2003) ﬁnds that an exchange-rate policy can be quite
eﬀective in creating stimulus when the zero bound is binding. But what is actually shown is that a rational-
expectations equilibrium exists in which the exchange rate depreciates and deﬂation is halted; these eﬀects
could be viewed as resulting from a credible commitment to a target path for the price level, similar to the
one discussed in section 3, and not requiring any intervention in the foreign exchange market at all.
58appreciation, achievement of a higher price-level target for one country in no way prevents
other countries from raising their price levels as well.
5.2 Providing Incentives to Improve Credibility
A related but somewhat distinct argument is that actions at the zero bound may help to
render the central bank’s commitment to an optimal policy more credible, by providing
the bank with a motive to behave in the future in the way that it would currently wish
that people would expect it to behave. Here we brieﬂy discuss how policy actions that are
possible while the economy remains in a “liquidity trap” may be helpful in this regard. Our
perspective is not so much that the central bank is in need of a “commitment technology”
because it will itself be unable to resist the temptation to break its commitments later in
the absence of such a constraint, as that it may well be in need of a way of making its
commitment visible to the private sector. Taking actions now that imply that the central
bank will be disadvantaged later if it were to deviate from the policy to which it wishes to
commit itself can serve this purpose.
To consider what kind of current actions provide useful incentives, it is helpful to analyze
(Markov) equilibrium under the assumption that policy is conducted by a discretionary
optimizer, unable to commit its future actions at all, as in Eggertsson (2003a, b). Let us
ﬁrst consider what a Markov equilibrium under discretionary optimization would be like, in
the case that the only policy instrument is the choice each period of a short-term nominal
interest rate, and the objective of the central bank is the minimization of the loss function
(2.6). As shown in section 3, if credible commitment of future interest-rate policy is possible,
this problem has a solution in which the zero bound does not result in too serious a distortion,
though it does bind.
Under discretion, however, the outcome will be much inferior. Note that discretionary
policy (under the assumption of Markov equilibrium in the dynamic policy game) is an
example of a purely forward-looking policy. It then follows from our argument in section 3
that the equilibrium outcome will correspond to the kind of equilibrium discussed there in
59the case of a strict inﬂation target. More speciﬁcally, it is obvious that the equilibrium is
the same as under a strict inﬂation target ¼¤ = 0; since this is the inﬂation rate that will be
chosen by the discretionary optimizer once the natural rate is again at its steady-state level.
(From that point onward, a policy of zero inﬂation clearly minimizes the remaining terms in
the discounted loss function.)
As shown in Figure 2, an expectation by the private sector that the central bank will
behave in this fashion results in a deep and prolonged contraction of economic activity and a
sustained deﬂation, in the case that the natural rate of interest remains negative for several
quarters. We have also seen that these eﬀects could largely be avoided, even in the absence
of other policy instruments, if the central bank were able to credibly commmit itself to a
history-dependent monetary policy in later periods. Thus, in the kind of situation considered
here, there is a deﬂationary bias to discretionary monetary policy, although, at its root, the
problem is again the one identiﬁed in the classic analysis of Kydland and Prescott (1977).
Let us now consider instead the extent to which the outcome could be improved, even in a
Markov equilibrium with discretionary optimization, by changing the nature of the policy
game.
One example of a current policy action, available even when the zero bound binds, that
can help to shift expectations regarding future policy in a desirable way is for the govern-
ment to cut taxes and issue additional nominal debt, as discussed in Eggertsson (2003a).
Alternatively, the tax cut can be ﬁnanced by money creation — for when the zero bound
binds, there is no diﬀerence between expanding the monetary base and issuing additional
short-term Treasury debt at a zero interest rate. This is essentially the kind of policy imag-
ined when people speak of a “helicopter drop” of additional money on the economy; but it
is the ﬁscal consequence of such an action with which we are here concerned.
Of course, if the objective of the central bank in setting monetary policy remains as
assumed above, this will make no diﬀerence to the discretionary equilibrium — the optimal
policy once the natural rate of interest becomes positive again will once more appear to be
the immediate pursuit of a strict zero inﬂation target. However, if the central bank also
60cares about reducing the social costs of increased taxation — whether due to collection
costs or other distortions — as it ought if it really takes social welfare into account, the
result is diﬀerent. As shown in Eggertsson (2003a), the tax cut will then increase inﬂation
expectations, even if the government cannot commit to future policy.37
Another instrument that may be used to change expectations regarding future monetary
policy is open-market purchases of real assets or foreign exchange. An open-market purchase
of real assets (say, real estate) can be thought of as another way of increasing nominal
government liabilities, which should aﬀect inﬂation incentives in much the same way as deﬁcit
spending, as discussed in Eggertsson (2003a). The alternative approach has the advantage
of not worsening the overall ﬁscal position of the government — a current concern in Japan,
owing to the size of the existing gross debt — while still increasing the ﬁscal incentive for
inﬂation. A further advantage of this approach is that it need not depend on a perceived
central-bank interest in reducing the burden of the public debt. Since the (nominal) capital
gains from inﬂation accrue to the central bank itself under this policy, the central bank may
be perceived to have an incentive to inﬂate simply on the ground that it cares about its own
balance sheet, for example on the ground that a strong balance sheet will help to ensure its
independence. (One can easily argue that under a rational scheme of cooperation between
the central bank and the government, the central bank should not choose policy on the basis
of concerns about its balance sheet — but under such an ideal regime, it should choose
monetary policy with a view to reduction of the burden of the public debt, among other
goals.)
The incentive eﬀects of open-market operations in foreign exchange are even simpler,
as shown by Eggertsson (2003b). Open-market purchases of foreign assets give the central
bank an incentive to inﬂate in the future in order to obtain capital gains at the expense of
foreigners. These will be valuable if it cares either about its own balance sheet or about
reducing the burden of the public debt, as in the case of real asset purchases. However,
37In the next section, we consider why this mechanism has not resulted in greater inﬂationary expectations
in Japan, given the current size of the public debt.
61capital gains on foreign exchange as a result of depreciation of the domestic currency will
be valuable even in the case that the central bank does not care about its balance sheet (for
example, because it cooperates perfectly with the Treasury) and yet does not care about
the burden of the debt either (for example, because non-distorting sources of revenue are
available to the Treasury). For capital gains at the expense of foreigners would allow an
increase in domestic spending (by either the government or the private sector), and this
must be valued by a central bank that acts in the national interest.
Under rational expectations, of course, no such capital gains are realized on average.
Still, the purchase of foreign assets can work as a commitment device, because reneging on
its inﬂation commitment would cause capital losses if the government holds foreign assets.
Purchases of foreign assets are thus a way of committing the government to looser monetary
policy in the future. This creates a reason for purchases of foreign exchange to cause a
devaluation (which will also stimulate current demand), even without any assumption of a
deviation from interest-rate parity, of the kind relied upon by authors such as McCallum
(2000) in recommending devaluation for Japan.
Clouse et al. (2003) argue that open-market purchases of long-term Treasuries should
also change expectations in a way that results in immediate stimulus. The argument is that
if the central bank were not to follow through on its commitment to keep short rates low for
a period of time, it should suﬀer a capital loss on the long bonds that it purchased at a price
that made sense only on the assumption that it would keep interest rates low. Similarly,
Tinsley (1999) has proposed for a policy that would create this kind of incentive even more
directly, namely, the sale by the Fed of options to obtain federal funds at a future date at a
certain price, on which the Fed would then stand to lose money if it did not keep the funds
rate at the rate to which it had previously committed itself.
While these proposals should also help to reinforce the credibility of the kind of policy
commitment associated with the optimal equilibrium (characterized in section 2), they have
at least one important disadvantage relative to purchases of real assets or of foreign exchange.
This is that they only provide the central bank an incentive to maintain low nominal interest
62rates for a certain period of time; they do not provide it with an incentive to ensure that
the price level eventually rises to a higher level, and so they may do little to counter private-
sector expectations that nominal interest rates will remain low for years — but because
goods prices are going to continue to fall, not because the central bank is committed to
eventual reﬂation. This is arguably the kind of expectations that have now taken root in
Japan, where even ten-year bond yields are already well below one percent, though prices
continue to fall and economic activity remains anemic. Creation of a perception that the
central bank has an incentive to continue trying to raise the price level, and not to be content
as long as nominal interest rates remain low, may be more a successful way of creating the
sort of expectations associated with the optimal equilibrium.
6 Reﬂections on Policy Options for Japan
Some remarks may be in order about the implications of our analysis for the continuing
eﬀorts to halt deﬂation in Japan. First of all, the irrelevance proposition presented in
section 1 indicates that “quantitative easing” beyond the size of monetary base required in
order to keep the call rate essentially at zero need not have any eﬀect at all on either real
activity or the path of prices. We suspect that this explains the apparent ineﬀectiveness of
“quantitative easing” as practiced by the Bank of Japan since March 2001.
Of course, in our analysis, open-market operations that increase the monetary base (when
short-term nominal interest rates are already at zero) are only ineﬀective insofar as they do
not change expectations about the future conduct of monetary policy. The massive increases
in base money implemented over the past two years have not halted deﬂation, on this account,
because, unlike the open-market operations hypothesized by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003),
they were not understood to imply a corresponding permanent increase in the monetary base.
It seems to us quite plausible that these increases in base money have not been expected
to be permanent. Not only has the BOJ made no reference to any intention to target a
higher price level (or a depreciated value of the yen on the foreign exchange markets) in
the future, but the very size of the increases in base money that have occurred are such
63as to make it implausible that they are intended to be permanent. After all, that would
imply that, once it has become possible to abandon the zero-interest-rate policy (so that
excess reserves will no longer be held, beyond those that generate services of suﬃcient value
to justify the foregone interest), the general level of prices would probably have to rise by
nearly 50 percent — something that one could not imagine being accepted even by a central
bank ﬁrmly committed to Krugmanesque “irresponsibility”.
An alternative view, argued by Hetzel (2003), is that the BOJ has not actually increased
bank reserves by more than the increase that has occurred in desired reserves at a zero
overnight interest rate, and that it is only for this reason that no further stimulus to aggregate
demand has been observed. This seems implausible to us, as it would require that a dramatic
increase in the demand for bank reserves occurred at precisely the time that the BOJ initiated
the policy of “quantitative easing.” However, even if Hetzel’s interpretation of BOJ policy
is correct, “demand-determined reserves provision” would imply that the increases in base
money since March 2001 are not intended to be permanent; for they should be reversed as
soon as a decline in perceived risks to the banking sector allows the ratio of desired reserves
to the volume of transactions to return to a more normal level. In our view, it is the BOJ’s
failure to contradict such expectations regarding its future policy that has undermined the
policy of “quantitative easing”. It is these expectations regarding future policy that need
directly to be addressed, rather than further swelling the current supply of bank reserves, in
a way that would make it even less plausible to imagine that the increase is intended to be
permanent.38
Our model can also shed light on the failure of deﬁcit spending to do more to stimulate the
Japanese economy and eliminate expectations of deﬂation. In our model — a representative-
38We have argued in section 4 that it can be desirable to supply a quantity of base money greater than is
required to keep interest rates at zero, under a policy commitment that serves to exclude the possibility of a
self-fulﬁlling deﬂationary trap, even after the natural rate of interest has become positive. However, under
the rule recommended there, the base money supply while the zero bound binds should be one that would not
be withdrawn were the bound to cease to bind: it is the monetary base that one expects would be demanded
if the target (gap-adjusted) price level were to be achieved, and so (except for the small adjustments in the
price-level target that one expects to occur) it corresponds to the monetary base that one expects to supply
in the future, once the target can be hit.
64household model with no constraints on borrowing against future income, in which we also
abstract from the supply-side eﬀects of taxation — the principle of “Ricardian equivalence”
holds. The aspects of the model just mentioned are plainly idealizations, and one would
not expect Ricardian equivalence to hold exactly in a more realistic model. Nonetheless, the
essential prediction of such a model does not seem to have been far oﬀ in Japan: decreases in
government saving (increases in government borrowing) have resulted in oﬀsetting increases
in private saving, so that little stimulus to aggregate demand has been achieved.
In our model, government deﬁcits could stimulate aggregate demand, and head oﬀ de-
ﬂation, if they changed expectations regarding future monetary policy. One reason why
deﬁcits might lead to an expectation of a higher future price level is provided in the anal-
ysis of Eggertsson (2003a). If future monetary policy is expected to be conducted under
discretion (and hence to be purely forward-looking), but to take account of the distortions
resulting from high tax rates, and not solely of inﬂation and output stabilization objectives,
then a higher nominal public debt should result in more inﬂationary monetary policy; and
so current deﬁcits, that increase the anticipated future level of nominal public debt, should
foreseeably increase the incentives for inﬂation in the future, as discussed in section 5.
The anticipation of such an eﬀect, however, depends on particular beliefs about the way
in which monetary policy is likely to be conducted in the future. The model of central-bank
behavior just sketched probably does not match the expectations of many observers regarding
the likely behavior of the Bank of Japan. In particular, the public may not anticipate that
the BOJ will care much about reducing the burden of the public debt when determining
future monetary policy. The expressed resistance of the Bank to suggestions that it increase
its purchases of Japanese government bonds, on the ground that this could encourage a lack
of ﬁscal discipline,39 has certainly suggested that reducing the burden of government ﬁnance
is not among its highest priorities. As Eggertsson (2003a) stresses, in order for ﬁscal policy
to be eﬀective as a means of increasing inﬂationary expectations, ﬁscal and monetary policy
must be coordinated to maximize social welfare.40 The consequences of a narrow concern
39See, e.g., Asahi Shimbun (1999).













Figure 9: Ratio of net and gross Japanese government debt to GDP..
with inﬂation stabilization on the part of the central bank, together with an inability to
credibly commit future monetary policy, can be dire, even from the point of view of the
bank’s own stabilization objectives, as we have shown in section 2.
Indeed, we would not propose that larger deﬁcits are what Japan needs at this point
in order to raise inﬂationary expectations. The Japanese public debt has doubled over the
past decade, as shown in Figure 9; we feel that the size of the nominal public debt that
has already been accumulated ought to provide a substantial incentive for an increase in the
general level of prices, if the BOJ takes into account the desirability of reducing the burden
of the public debt. It is true that the ﬁgures often cited as evidence of the ﬁscal recklessness
of the Japanese government somewhat overstate the true inﬂation incentives provided by
the public debt. For although gross nominal debt is 140 percent of annual GDP in Japan
today, a substantial portion of Treasury debt is held by other governmental institutions.
40Bernanke (2003) argues along similar lines.

























Figure 10: Maturity structure of outstanding Japanese government debt in years.
Government institutions such as Social Security, Postal Savings, Postal Life Insurance and
the Trust Fund Bureau hold a large part of this nominal debt. If the part of the public
debt that is held by these institutions is subtracted from the total value of gross government
debt it turns out that the “net” government debt is only 67 percent of GDP. It is important
to note that most of the government institutions that hold the government nominal debt
have real liabilities. For example, Social Security (that holds roughly 25% of the nominal
debt held by the government itself) pays Japanese pensions and medical expenses. Those
pensions are indexed to the CPI. If inﬂation increases, the real value of Social Security assets
will decrease but the real value of most its liabilities remain unchanged. Thus the Ministry
of Finance would eventually have to step in to make up for any loss in the value of Social
Security assets if the government is to keep its pension program unchanged. Therefore, the
gains of reducing the real value of outstanding debt is partly oﬀset by a decrease in the real
value of the assets of government institutions such as Social Security.













Figure 11: Reduction in the real value of public debt if rolled over to 2021.
Even so, Japanese government debt is large enough that a substantial reduction in the
revenues that will have to be raised through taxation could be achieved by even moderate
inﬂation. Figure 10 shows the maturity structure of outstanding debt in Japan, i.e., it shows
the nominal value of debt due to be paid from 2003-2023. We can use these data to calculate
the government’s revenue gains from inﬂation, if we make some simple assumption about
the evolution of the natural rate of interest. Figure 11 shows how much the real debt burden
would be reduced under diﬀerent inﬂation rates. The underlying assumption is that the
natural real rate is negative for 5 years at -2% and then returns to a positive rate. The
ﬁgure shows the real value of the debt in 2023 if it is rolled over from 2003 onwards. We
express the value of the debt as a ratio of real debt for a given inﬂation target over the real
value of the debt if there would be zero inﬂation. We display this ratio for 3, 4, 5, 10 and 20
percent inﬂation. We observe that there would be a substantial reduction in the real value
68of the debt with even a fairly modest rate of inﬂation; for example, it is reduced by more
than a quarter by a 4 percent inﬂation. Thus the level of public debt that already exists
would seem to provide a non-trivial incentive for inﬂation.
In our view, what is needed is not more debt, but rather a clariﬁcation of the principles
that will guide future monetary policy, of a kind that would imply that the existing incen-
tives for inﬂation will actually be reﬂected in future monetary policy. (In the analysis of
Eggertsson, 2003a, an increase in the deﬁcit is needed to reduce the current rate of deﬂation;
but this is under the assumption that the rate of expected future inﬂation given the already
existing nominal public debt reﬂects the incentives to inﬂate provided by that level of debt.)
Thus, once again, the key to the ineﬀectiveness of the measures undertaken thus far is the
lack of any reason for the public to believe that either the recent growth in the monetary
base or the recent explosion of the public debt implies a likelihood of looser monetary policy
in the future.
Indeed, our most important general conclusion is that the key to dealing with a situation
in which monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on short-term nominal
interest rates is the skillful management of expectations regarding the future conduct of
policy. By “management of expectations” we do not mean that the central bank should
imagine that with suﬃcient guile it can lead the private sector to believe whatever if wishes
it to, independently of what it actually does; we have instead assumed that there is no point
in trying to get the private sector to expect something that it does not itself intend to bring
about. But we do contend that it is highly desirable for a central bank to be able to commit
itself in advantage to a course of action that is desirable due to the beneﬁts that ﬂow from
its being anticipated, and then to work to make this commitment credible to the private
sector.
We have further argued that a particularly desirable form of commitment regarding future
monetary policy would be a commitment to eventually achieve a general level prices as high
as prices would have been in the absence of a period in which the zero bound constrained
policy — or ideally, even to a slightly higher level, as a consequence of the binding zero
69bound. This is not precisely the same advice as the often-heard prescription that Japan
needs an “inﬂation target”. Indeed, our analysis in section 2 has shown that the purely
forward-looking pursuit of a ﬁxed inﬂation target can have quite bad consequences — either
a sharp contraction during the period of the liquidity trap, if the inﬂation target is set at
a desirable long-run level, or persistent distortions as a result of long-run inﬂation, if the
inﬂation target is set at a high enough level to keep the zero bound from binding even while
the natural rate of interest is negative. A target for the price level instead makes the policy
commitment history-dependent in a desirable way: the farther prices fall below their target
level as a result of persistence of the liquidity trap, the greater the length of time that people
have reason to expect policy to continue to be loose, after the date at which the natural rate
of interest has again become positive.
The Bank of Japan has resisted calls for adoption of an inﬂation target, on the ground
that while the zero bound is binding, it lacks an instrument with which to hit such a target.
For example, Kunio Okina has argued that “because short-term interest rates are already
at zero, setting an inﬂation target of, say, 2 percent wouldn’t carry much credibility” (Dow
Jones News, 1999). However, in our view, the announcement of a price-level target can be
valuable, even when it is not considered likely that the target can be hit within, say, the
coming year. Under the optimal targeting rule derived for our model, the central bank’s
commitment is only to adjust short-term nominal interest rates so as to hit the target if this
does not require an interest rate lower than zero, and otherwise to maintain a zero interest
rate until the target can be his. Thus consistent undershooting of the target for a year or
longer would not undermine the credibility of the central bank’s announced target, as long
as the zero-interest-rate policy had been consistently been maintained during such a period.
Nor would the announcement of the target have been pointless in the period in which it
could not be hit. For awareness of the level which prices must reach before the ZIRP can
be abandoned automatically creates expectations of more inﬂation in the future (and of a
longer period of low interest rates), the lower present prices may fall; and expectations of
this kind should reduce the extent to which prices can actually fall, even during the period
70in which the zero bound continues to bind.
One policy that may have had some success in Japan is the policy of repeated interven-
tions in the foreign exchange market by the Ministry of Finance during the ﬁrst half of 2003.
This policy appears to have prevented further appreciation of the yen, in which case it may
well have played an important role in the recent improvement in real growth in Japan. As
discussed in the previous section, foreign-exchange market intervention is another example
of a policy that should have negligible eﬀects on either asset prices or the economy more
generally, except insofar as it is taken to signal a chance in the likely stance of future mon-
etary policy. Yet intervention against an exchange rate that indicates market expectations
inconsistent with the policy commitments of the government may succeed in changing those
expectations, as argued by Svensson (2003).
Even so, we would expect such an eﬀect to be achieved more reliably if the foreign-
exchange purchases were accompanied by explicit discussion of the policy targets that imply
misalignment of the current exchange rate. We believe, furthermore, that it would be best to
explain such interventions in terms of a target for the general level of prices in Japan, rather
than a target (or target path) for the exchange rate itself. One advantage of this is that
Japan’s trading partners — who may themselves be concerned about the risk of deﬂation,
as in the U.S. this year — would then have no reason to interpret the MOF’s actions as part
of a strategy intended to “export deﬂation” abroad. Of course, in order for the public to
believe that future Japanese policy will seek to achieve a particular price-level target, they
would above all have to believe in the commitment of the BOJ to the target. Thus, once
again, it would seem highly desirable for the BOJ and MOF to be able to coordinate both
their policy actions and the way in which they speak about the targets that will guide future
policy.
Given the role of private-sector anticipation of history-dependent policy in making pos-
sible a desirable outcome when an economy ﬁnds itself in a liquidity trap, it is important
for the authorities to develop eﬀective methods of signaling their policy commitments to the
private sector. An essential precondition for this, certainly, is for the central bank itself to
71clearly understand the kind of history-dependent behavior to which it should be seen to be
committed, so that it can communicate its thinking on the matter and act consistently with
the principles that it wishes the private sector to understand, and that it wishes for other
branches of the government to support. Simply conducting policy in accordance with a rule
may not suﬃce in itself to bring about an optimal, or nearly optimal, equilibrium; but it is
the place to start.
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